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U.S. China Relations. A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall?

By Dan Harris on Posted in China Business, Recommended Reading

Just got the following email from an “avid” CLB reader:

Hi Dan,

I’m an avid reader of your blog and really like your objective take on China regarding everything from business, Chinese law, to Sino-U.S. relations. I was hoping that you might give your take to readers about a relatively new article that just came out in the National Interest by a professor from Princeton, Aaron Friedberg, called “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics.

In essence, the article states that the US and China are bound to be hostile to one another if for no other reason than their differing political ideologies. Though he contends that the two countries can do business
and even have a semblance of cooperation, in the long run, America will never be comfortable seeding control and responsibility for the international order to China like the British did to America. Over the
last few months, I’ve read many articles that have touched on this ideological undertone, and thus far, this is the most comprehensive one I’ve read. Although nothing new, there does seem to be a resurgence to
this theme when describing Sino-US relations moving forward.

For me, I work at a __________ firm in [Chinese City] that focuses on helping American Fortune 500 companies institutionalize their government relations in China, which not only helps secure future business
objectives, but also plays a role in improving overall US-China relations. We are very active in teaming up our companies with numerous joint US-China govt.-to-govt. platforms like People-to-People exchanges
and 100,000 strong initiative. Through this I’ve come to see first hand the numerous platforms, cooperation, and conflict that form the basis of the business and political relationship between the two countries. I can attest that although there is a lot of conflict in the relationship, there is also a lot of dialogue too.

I want to believe that these government-to-government. programs and more frequent contacts between the two countries will somehow ameliorate tension in the long run, but I also know that the two systems are fundamentally hostile to one another, which doesn’t give me hope that the mistrust can be overcome with further contacts and deepening economic and business relationships. I think the author explains this in very good detail, but I also feel that he oversimplifies the issue by casting it in such a black and white fashion. If you have time, I would greatly appreciate you enlightening your readers about this theme, which I feel lies at the heart of overall U.S-China relations.

I responded as follows:

I actually had read that article and thought it was very well written, very thoughtful, and very depressing. I thought of blogging on it but then chose not to because I am not a foreign policy expert and because I am generally of the view that long-term predictions are nearly worthless. In other words, I’m with you in thinking that it could easily go either way.  But I really like what you wrote about the article and I also like that you are the third person to recommend it to me (which I think is the most recommendations I have received for a foreign policy article) and the other two emails on this were not too dissimilar to yours. So I am going to do a blog post on this and the thrust of it is going to be your email to me. 

This reader then responded with the following:

Thank you very much for the soon-to-be released blog post. Although the brunt of the article is foreign policy related, Sino-US relations can’t be neatly contextualized in just foreign policy lexicon alone. That is why I think you, as a China expert, can more aptly break down the article, which will not only be really appreciated by your readers, but also spark a great deal of debate as well.

I do not think I am qualified to say much about this article as I am neither a foreign policy expert nor am I a China expert (who really is?). I know Chinese law and related strategies relating to foreign (mostly Western) investment in China; I do not think that qualifies me to opine on foreign policy.

I also take issue with the idea that I am objective. Though I strive to be fair and to comprehensively analyze both sides of an issue, I would never claim objectivity in that I have some fairly strong biases. I do think of myself as a moderate and I do try to focus on common sense solutions and analysis, but that is not the same thing as objectivity. I mention all this because one of my biases is my belief that relations between countries, such as China and the United States, depend far more on governments than on people. Yes I know governments are made up of people, but what I am saying is that resolution of virtually all of the US-China relationship issues raised by this article will be determined by the two countries’ political elites and that means foreign policy. People to people exchanges are great for many reasons, but I just do not think they have much, if any, impact at all on country to country relations. 

What do you think of the article? What will the China-US relationship be like ten years from now?  Twenty years from now?  What will influence that relationship? With what do you agree or disagree in the article?

  • http://www.gunshi.wordpress.com David

    Q: What will the China-US relationship be like ten years from now? Twenty years from now? What will influence that relationship? With what do you agree or disagree in the article?
    A: Partly, in Dan’s words, “I am generally of the view that long-term predictions are nearly worthless.” Nonetheless, there are several driving factors and I’d like to comment on the particular theme of China’s government as it relates to the people. Dan says, “virtually all of the US-China relationship issues raised by this article will be determined by the two countries’ political elites and that means foreign policy.” I agree, however, it may be important to reconsider the genetic makeup of “the political elites”, especially in the years to come.
    Ambassador Roy, who came to Washington at the end of President Eisenhower’s first term (1957) stresses the significance of the upcoming generational transitions in the Communist party, particularly within the Politburo, a significant source of power within the Party. If age limits are adhered to, over 40 percent of the full 25 members will step down and be replaced by younger leaders. Roy is optimistic that new leaders will not respond to the problems of managing China by using “canned formula’s inherited from their predecessors.” Rather, a major driver of political change will come from the greater youthfulness of the ruling group who spent most of their adult careers during the period of reform and openness.
    Although there is no way to objectively quantify the dimensions that have opened China to the world in contemporary times, a glance at the hundreds of thousands who have studied abroad, the millions who travel abroad on official trips for business or for tourism every year provide invaluable insight. In the 2009-2010 academic-year alone over 125,000 Chinese students traveled to America to study, an increase of 18% from the year before. Greater access to information precede greater freedom for discussion, and now tens of millions of Chinese can compare conditions in China with conditions in other countries on the basis of personal experience and observation.
    In sum, an unprecedented level of affluence, coupled with a structural transition of leadership may lead one to believe in a US-Sino relationship with more cooperation than conflict.

  • http://Www.inpraiseofchina.com Godfree roberts

    The USA a liberal democracy? Hardly.
    We are a one party (capitalist) autocracy and have been for over 200 years.
    At least the Chinese are honest about their autocracy.
    The real question is, which autocracy will prevail?
    Right now it appears that China wins by default, given the behavior of our Congress in the face of America’s decline.
    “Ultimately”‘ as Toynbee observed, ” all great powers commit suicide”. Let us watch in irrepressible horror as we prove him right. While the Chinese, who actually DO learn from history, cushion our fall.

  • Bill Rich

    The issue is not what the Sino-American relationship will be, but what Americans want to give up in order to continue do do business with PRC. If Americans don’t mind letting China take control of all of East Asia and Pacific, and even Australia and probably Hawaii, and become the sole super economic/military/political power of the world, America can start reducing its military, economic, political, cultural, technological influence in the region. And, in the end, Middle East, Africa and Europe will also become appendages of China. That way, we can continue to have good commercial relationship with China. And that is an easy out.
    If Americans still want America to play a role in world politics and economy, it will be hard work, real hard work, just like right after the 1941 December incident, when US lost a lot of its power, and had to regroup, re-entrench, and find a long term strategy to finish the war, and what to do when the war is over. Last time, it was deal with Europe first, and deal with Pacific later, and out produce the competition. What will it be now ? Look after your short term commercial interest first ?

  • Andeli

    The issue of US – China relations will be confined to Asia. China has too many territorial dispute and not enough direct natural allies to reach beyond its regional sphere. To put it simply there are limits to how bad or how good the US- China relationship can get.
    First: Any confrontation between China and the US will involve third and fourth parties, which will properly be working against the Chinese side, with the odd exception of North Korea of course.
    Second: China has no significant cultural impact on the rest of the world in terms of media, religion or political ideas Nor has it military force to back up positions outside of its national sphere.
    Third: China is a threat to US interests in the same fashion that other developing nations are threats, as competitors in the race for resources. But these other developing such as India or Russia will not allow China to become the only regional power, because they have their own interests. India has water issues with China and Russia will have territorial worries.
    In the future the stand off will not be between China and the US, as much as it will be between the developing countries and the developed countries. The cold war mentality of two combatants with multiple vassal states is over. The time when a one nation can have significant influence over other nations is long gone. In that sense China’s rise to power came too late in history. A sovereign nation will let other nations influence it to some degree, but it will not allow any form of control anymore and it can back up its sovereignty.
    The Chinese dependency on the rest of the world and especially on the US through export of goods and import of foods and energy will put very natural restraints on its expansion. The production of foods in China is already touching its limits, and this problem can only be resolved through purchases on the world market. Not something that characterises a power to challenge the US in a short or long run.

  • aaron

    1 US policy commentator recently wrote lamenting the new Chinese “Triumphalism” that some Chinese leaders have declared now that China now can only learn from the mistakes of the West, in other words, there are no positive lessons to learn from the West.
    The writer is perhaps correct in the overly generalized triumphalism among some Chinese leaders.
    However, the writer does not compare the Chinese triumphalism with the persistent exceptionalism and triumphalism among Western leaders, who never admitted any thing positive or negative to learn from China (for that matter, from any non-Western non-1st world nations).
    Ultimately, history is about learning. Those who can learn fastest, adapt and survive. Those who do not learn from others, stagnate and get left behind.
    Learning from others, positive or negative lessons, is essential, because a person or a nation can be locked into a single mindset, or get tunnel-visioned, and because a person or a nation is limited in experiences.
    In this aspect, the Chinese leaders have shown their consistent willingness to modify their own thinkings to adjust to what they learned from other nations, to adapt, to modify and achieve their specific objectives to continue development.
    US, in comparison, is getting left behind, because its leaders are stuck with the same rhetorics election after election, with the mindset that they have already learned all the important lessons about economy, politics, religion, and international affairs.
    This is the essence of the differences.
    Yes, if this persists, US will undoubtedly be intolerant of a rising China eventually, as similarly it would be intolerant of being told that it needs new lessons.
    China has accepted hard lessons and adjusted its policies in the last 30 years to drastically change its politics and its economy, to grow and to develop.
    I doubt US can even imagine itself doing a similarly drastic reform program to push ahead or to keep its superpower status.

  • aaron

    Author Aaron Friedberg (no relation to me), wrote,
    “Since 1949, China’s rulers have shown a particular penchant for deception and surprise attacks. (Think of Beijing’s entry into the Korean War in December 1950, or its attack on India in October 1962.)”
    Unfortunately, the article is rather peppered with such generalized assertions.
    I think most historians today with any amount detailed analysis on the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, have largely concluded that the “surprise” at China’s entry into those 2 wars were largely due to miscalculations on part of US and India.
    In sum, China made no “deceptions”, when US and India simply refused to believe that a rather weak China would dare to enter those conflicts.
    US leaders simply didn’t believe that China had the will to fight a war against US in Korea.
    Indian leaders summarily dismissed the possibility that Chinese military was up to the job to challenge India along the border on the Tibetan highlands.
    >
    The author commits the same mistakes common in perceptions of China.
    That being, attributing his own inability to understand China fully to China’s “deception”.
    Unfortunately, too many US policy commentators today are too often “surprised” by their own inability to understand other nations.

  • Twofish

    David: . If age limits are adhered to, over 40 percent of the full 25 members will step down and be replaced by younger leaders. Roy is optimistic that new leaders will not respond to the problems of managing China by using “canned formula’s inherited from their predecessors.” Rather, a major driver of political change will come from the greater youthfulness of the ruling group who spent most of their adult careers during the period of reform and openness.
    But people said the same thing ten years ago or twenty years ago.
    Also the note the contradiction here. On the one hand the policies of their predecessors are “canned” whereas there are also the “period of reform and openness.”
    The other point is that “if you are surprised, you aren’t paying attention.”

  • http://justrecently.wordpress.com/ justrecently

    Disclaimer first: I’m no expert either, but I’m trying to think along with whatever kind of expertise there may be.
    As this is pretty much about international politics and relations, I’m leaving the U.S. and Chinese future growth aside – either may get derailed, or continued. Let’s just assume that they will both have a lot of “hegemonic potential”.
    What strikes me first is the idea that China would be returning to a position of – regional, at least – pre-eminence, and that its “failure” to stay at the top in the past is that flatly blamed on foreign powers, rather than on factors within China. Given that America has its own manifest destiny or view of its own uniqueness, these two countries will of course be at odds in such ways.
    Secondly, democracies are in a stronger position, re legitimacy – I believe that much of China’s defensive reactions to foreign criticism would suggest that they feel pretty much the same way. Leaders and underlings alike. They just keep denying it, for a number of reasons.
    America’s activities across Asia, deemed by Beijing as encirclement – right here, I think the matter of sustained rivalry in the western Pacific will be decided. It’s nice to profit from China’s economic growth on the one hand, and to rely on the pax americana on the other. If countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, et al – possibly Australia, too – think of the arrangement as a free ride, it won’t last. If there is going to be an alliance, more or less institutionalized, with a shared defense burden, it could be sustainable (and it could help Taiwan, too, even if Taipei stays out of it, formally).
    The article itself puts it quite nicely, on its fifth page. They need an international environment “safe for authoritarianism”. What I and many other citizens of comparatively free countries resent is not only opposition being bought off by the CCP (we may not care much, depending on how globally we’d think), but our own elites being bought off. To a degree, every Dalai Lama visit is an indicator here, and that’s probably why such visits and the treatment Tibet’s supreme monk is or isn’t getting is news. (Obviously, there are more hidden negotiation processes which carry much more weight – but they aren’t that transparent.)
    I agree with the article’s author that a China with free citizens would be a more peaceful neighbor in East and South Asia, despite sometimes more erratic operations. Besides, the need to keep its people “rallying behind the center” has frequently created surprises of their own. I’m not so convinced that the CCP hasn’t gone to great lengths to keep nationalist passions in check.
    But I don’t expect China to become democratic because of domestic reasons or lobbying – not in a peaceful way, in which the CCP would cede power, the way the KMT did in Taiwan, anyway. Which brings me back to the fifth para of my comment. How “safe” the environment for authoritarianism will be will to a large extent depend on China’s neighbors.

  • Aaron
  • http://justrecently.wordpress.com/ justrecently

    The hiddenharmonies blogpost is about what “the Chinese” want. However, to find out what “they” want, or to see how theChinese themselves find out, China would indeed need to become democratic. Friedberg wrote in his article that he’d expect a more democratic China to create a more peaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia.
    I believe that many Egyptians never knew how much they “hated” Mubarak and his regime, as long as there was no chance that the status quo might change. Public opinion was mostly frozen. Chinese “public opinion” today is no more predictable than Egypt’s under Mubarak.