Header graphic for print
China Law Blog China Law for Business

What Is China’s Long-Term Economic Future?

Posted in China Business, Legal News

China’s nominal per-capita GDP stands close to $4500. This is about a third of the way towards a developmental milestone INSEAD economists Antonio Fatas and Ilian Mihov have dubbed “The Great Wall.” Fatas and Mihov have given this name to attaining over $15,000 in per-capita GDP because over the past thirty years middle income countries have consistently failed at climbing over it into the ranks of advanced nations.

In a recent Wall Street Journal article, entitled, “Is Mexico China’s Future,” Bob Davis also talks of the difficulty emerging countries have in reaching developed status and notes that “Singapore and South Korea are nearly alone in having made the transition.” Nearly everyone else gets stuck in a sort of Mexican purgatory where continued growth is dependent on continued reform of governmental and financial institutions:

Most every other poor nation — whether one calls them “third world,” “developing” or “emerging” — gets stuck in second-tier, Mexican-style status.

“Absent continuing reforms,” the economists argue, “Chinese growth is likely to slow down sharply, perhaps leaving China at a level less than Mexico’s” — an outcome that would be a hard slap to the China-as-future crowd.

While Mexico and China seem very different, the economists point out a number of similarities. On the positive side, the two nations focused on foreign trade as a growth engine and they eased central government control of the economy. On the negative side, their financial systems are inefficient, their non-tradable industries (communications, transportation and the like) lack competition; and their rigid labor rules discourage employers from adding full-time workers.

The thinking on this is that it is relatively easy for developing nations to make big yearly moves in their per-capita, but only up to a certain, Mexico-like point. After that, top tier governing and financial reform becomes necessary to become Denmark-like:

Once that catch-up period is over, however, the countries need to continue to reform institutions and policies to produce a well-functioning government an efficient financial system and a steady increase in knowledge so it can continue to grow smartly. Few countries manage that transition, which leaves them well behind the U.S. and Europe.

In its post, “China’s $10,000-12,000 Question, the China Bystander blog (a superb blog, by the way) posits that China will not reach developed status without some serious changes: 

“There is not a single country that has good quality institutions and is poor,” Mihov said in Singapore. “The gap between rich and poor is driven by poor productivity that is linked to poor quality institutions and poor business environment.” As evidence he offers the contrasting experiences of Singapore and Venezuela. Even more dramatically, consider the economies of the old Soviet bloc, which collapsed as per capita incomes hit and then got stuck at the $12,000 a year level (adjusted for current prices).

China Bystander himself adds that poor quality in China is linked to set of very specific problems and that China’s ability to get past The Great Wall will depend on its ability not only to reform, but to reform quickly enough:

China’s annual per capital income is $4,000. At current growth rates that gives it less than a decade before it starts bearing down in earnest on that tipping point or The Great Wall as Mihov inevitably dubs it.

China Bystander sees SOEs as another potential impediment:

The growing economic and political clout of state-owned enterprises is another possible impediment to progress. Like Japan before it, China has grown fast by replicating and improving on what advanced economies have already done and producing and selling the results much more cheaply. Yet, as Japan found out, there comes a point where innovation has to replace imitation if growth is to be sustained.

China’s state-owned national champions and aspiring multinationals are ambitious, adaptive and fast learners (as were Japan’s). They are developing R&D and product development capabilities but they remain reliant on access to low-cost capital from the state, have rudimentary organizational and financial management skills by the standards of multinationals and have yet to acquire two of the most essential traits of a globalized multinational, managing diversity and allowing the intrapreneurship in which innovation can flourish (traits that few Japanese multinationals were able to acquire).

Beijing is throwing a wall of money and of engineers and scientists at making its national champions more innovative (dealing with diversity isn’t even on the radar). Yet in the process of building up the SOEs it is distorting markets and entrenching vested interests that increase the resistance to reform. It also crowds out small and medium sized companies where growth-generating innovation truly flourishes.

China Bystander also thinks China’s demographics bode ill for it climbing over the Wall:

China has already reaped the benefits of a demographic dividend, which is believed to have played a role in the country’s economic breakthrough, having enjoyed the advantage of abundant cheap labor for decades.

“Wage increases are the most direct response to labor shortages. That will definitely squeeze the profit margin for some low value-added manufacturers,” Zhang said.

What will China do and what will China’s economic future be? I have heard many say they think the Chinese government will be fine with the $12,000-$15,000 wall, preferring to stop there than to reform “too much.”  i personally think it is too early to judge. I mean, who knew Korea and Singapore would keep growing while Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand would fail to keep pace? What is the difference between Korea and Singapore and Chile (whose economy has done amazingly well over the last ten years) on the one hand, and Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico and Thailand on the other? And if you answer better governance, then you have to explain why Singapore and Korea got it and the other three did not? Same if your answer focuses on corruption. So really, which way will China go? Korea/Singapore or Malaysia/Thailand/Mexico?

What do you think will happen? Will China climb over the wall, merely bang against it or never get close? Why?

  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IQ_and_the_Wealth_of_Nations IQ and wealth of nations

    The quality of the people. That’s the biggest difference among these countries that the liberals don’t want to admit.

  • http://seeingredinchina.com Tom

    I think China Bystander is absolutely correct in saying it’s not just a matter of making the changes, but that they also have to come before a key moment.
    I’m thinking perhaps that S. Korea’s shift in the 80′s is a factor in its success (although my knowledge of the country is limited).
    Also I can’t help but wonder what the GINI coefficient was in in these countries when they were making these transitions. China’s gap between rich and poor is growing larger by the minute it seems, which pushes it much closer to the Mexico model.
    Finally I know this is anecdotal but a co-worker told me after living 20 years in China she thought communism here had been a laughable notion from the very beginning. Chinese society has been dominated by elites and fed by peasants for thousands of years, and now it needs to change in the next 20? I know China is famous for it’s massive ideological shifts this century, but there might be too much momentum.

  • Chris

    Great questions Dan. I have lived and worked in Korea, Singapore and China , as well as Hong Kong and the Philippines (I am American) for the last 20 years.
    What is the difference between Korea/Singapore/Chile (You can include HK in here too) and the other countries you mentioned? It comes down to societal values, I believe. Is government’s mandate to enrich the lives of all around in society and make a better society for all, or is it to place the vested interests of various clans, social classes, religious groups, business groups etc, which Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Mexico, etc have, above the greater goals of social equity.
    I know all through S. Korea’s rise, income equity across all citizens was amongst the most equal in the world. Anecdotal evidence of Singapore would suggest the same. In contrast, a place like the Philippines can show what neo-feudalism can do to a bright and talented citizenry. The entrenched interest of the land owning class has always outweighed the goal of development for the whole society. Cory Aquino had her chance after the ouster of Neo-feudal leader #1 Ferdinand Marcos. She had the chance to implement serious and game changing land reform when she instituted her new government with its new constitution. This would have fundamentally changed the Philippines for every and would have re-distributed the wealth and power (in a positive way) of the Philippines for ever. Without this reform, the Philippines will continue to remain a neo-feudal society (as will the other countries who cannot break through the “Great Wall ” of development.
    Now on the the greater question of what will happen in China? Wealth distribution is one of the biggest factors that will effect China. Unlike Korea and Singapore, China’s development has been lopsided when it comes income distribution. The Gini Co-efficient is off the charts when compared to all other models. I believe it will be this factor that will be the most important in deciding if the current Chinese government can make it over the Great Wall of Development or will its inability to manage income distribution be the arrow in the heal of the Communist party?

  • dan berg

    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/business/global/building-binge-by-chinas-cities-threatens-countrys-economic-boom.html?ref=global-home Another article documenting what appears to me to be unsustainable. Fixed asset investment is now 70% of gdp. Qingdao is also building a new subway system; bridges; freeways; opera house, etc. “Unsustainable” does not mean imminent collapse; simply cannot continue. Diminishing returns to capital and rising debt will lead to a future slowdown. When? No one knows.

  • CK

    I think Malaysia became complacent, while Singapore (and Korea?) were driven by deep insecurity.
    I’d say China will continue to have deep insecurities, both internal & external, and this may be enough to motivate the government to continue prioritising high economic growth. Just a thought.

  • Twofish

    Mihov: “There is not a single country that has good quality institutions and is poor,”
    This is a useless statement, since *by definition* the quality of the institution is defined as “that which makes a country not-poor.” Also, one can argue that wealth influences institutional quality more than the other way around. If you are a wealthy country, you can pay your civil servants enough so that they don’t take bribes. Hong Kong is a good example of this.
    Also “reform” is a stupid and meaningless word. It’s stupid and meaningless because the big disagreements are about what sort of reforms to make.
    Mihov: It also crowds out small and medium sized companies where growth-generating innovation truly flourishes.
    I don’t agree with the idea that growth-generating innovation is inherently a domain of small companies. A lot of useful stuff came out of Bell Labs and IBM when there were de-facto monopolies, and a lot of innovations come out of aerospace and defense which are huge capital intensive companies.
    The problem with questions like these is that a lot depends on your economic philosophy. If you think that SOE’s and heavy government involvement in the economy is a bad thing, then you are going to conclude that China is going to hit a wall.
    But it’s an open question whether state-owned enterprises and heavy government involvement in the economy is a bad thing. The Chinese government certainly doesn’t think so. Part of the reason it thinks so is that it’s copying Singapore and Korea which have governments that are heavily interventionist.
    There are times when it is best to just say “I don’t know.” One reason that I’m optimistic about China is that Chinese economists are more likely than Western economists to say “I don’t know.” Because once you say “I don’t know” the next thing that you say is “let’s try an experiment and find out.”
    The other thing is mentioning Japan. Japan’s economy has hit a wall, but it’s happened at the $30,000/year level rather than the $12,000./year level. I think it’s a different wall. Also there is a good chance that the US has also hit a wall, but again, it’s a different wall.

  • Twofish

    I can imagine a Chinese bureaucrat looking at a Western economist talking about “financial system reform” and say “Whoa, here,. after Enron/Lehman brothers/two market bubbles/10% unemployment are giving *us* advice on financial system reform, and you are complaining about how *we* run our financial system. We are putting our money into high speed railways, and infrastructure, and passing lots of regulations to restrain construction, and you are telling us that *our* financial system is inefficient?”
    Also people have short memories. Let’s go back to the 1990′s, and look at all of the advice that people were giving Mexico about their financial system, and then look at the reports from the Heritage Foundation saying that Singapore was doomed.
    After Lehman, which wasn’t that long ago, some humility is in order.

  • Twofish

    Mihov: Can authoritarian or oligarchic states join the ranks of the world’s wealthy, and even gain global economic primacy?
    Yes. Authoritarian Singapore, and oligarachic Hong Kong both did it. Singapore is more liberal than the PRC, and Hong Kong has strong laws and good press freedom, but neither are liberal democracies.
    By contrast, you can (and I’m sure that people in the CCP do) use Mexico, Argentina, Russia, Turkey, and Thailand as examples of “this is why we must preserve a one-Party state.”
    The other thing is that I don’t think you can exclude the role of individuals. Singapore is the way it is because Lee Kuan Yew is a modern day “benevolent dictator” that ran and runs Singapore like a family business in a good way. If you switched Lee Kuan Yew with Suharto or Ferdinand Marcos, things would be very different.

  • Falen

    I’ve always argued that, without industrial policy, Taiwan would never have organically produced TSMC. I think strictly adhering to free market theory is akin to playing a ball game with the same strategy for every game, truly a recipe for failure no matter how good your individual player is.

  • ollumi

    @Twofish – While I’m continued to be impressed by your intelligence and eloquence, somehow I’m not surprised at all at the free passes larger institutions in China are continuing to get from you.
    I think economic philosophy is the wrong lens by which to examine Chinese SOE’s in comparison with Korean ones(I just don’t know a lot about the Singapore situation first hand so I’ll have to plead ignorance there). Speaking in very general terms, Korean Chaebol’s fuels their growth through exports. Chinese SOE’s fuels their growth through monopolistic domestic practices. More importantly, while I definitely agree with you that capital-intensive industries such as aerospace almost necessarily needs to be supported long-term by the state in order to flourish, especially given China’s state of production process development, it’s a real question whether said capital is being invested in the right place or at all by the Chinese SOE.
    Let’s do look at aerospace – almost all of the investment is going toward co-ops with foreign OEM’s in the form of land or equipment to forge some sort of assembly arrangement domestically, hoping that through such agreements, even if the technology transfer for the core components aren’t explicitly included, can provide the environment where one could just take apart the thing like a radio in a workshop and rebuild it, piece by piece. And complete technology transfer by set deadline is what is being advertised, regardless of agreement or reality.
    The problem is the areas where state capital investment is most needed – where there is no immediate prospect of a shiny new machine where you throw your money or a brand new factory – such as materials(where state owned steel enterprises consider the volume too small to expend any real effort) and process control are where investment is little to non-existent. More importantly, while SOE’s don’t have the whip of Wall Street on their backs to affect innovation, increasingly they have the even more pragmatic demands of mandates from the top. These mandates often come in the form of what complete project or what end product by what time, without going too much into the nitty gritty – as they can’t possibly do so. The incentives of this mandate system are rigged so that no member of an SOE is rewarded by sticking his or her figurative neck out and innovating, even if the innovation turns out to be beneficial, whereas going with cosmetic copies of a large foreign multinational’s product, where you “innovate” your shell or screw(well, okay, not even that, as I can’t begin to count the number of accidents starting with screws) is no-risk because if anything happens, following above said SOP means the accident is either a) the product’s defect or b)a force majeur.
    Veteran large foreign MNC’s and their advisers are well aware of this current mechanism and do everything they can to encourage its propagation and defend its existence.
    It is also troubling that SOE’s are crowding out not only these capital intensive industries but all industries where they smell cash, like a good capitalist should.
    I think the Chinese government also realize to some extent the degree to which their SOE’s have utilized their unspoken imperative, thus the recent line from party officials seem to have extended some sort of branch toward SME’s, but if it’s a one time event, I’m highly skeptical of its long term effect.
    @Chris
    I think that’s an interesting observation, though I am very curious as to what has changed in Singapore since I last stayed(admittedly in the late 90s, so a long time ago). My impressions then were that the society was very heavily divided by class, and the gulf was widening, not narrowing.

  • Chris

    @ CK – you make a good point about insecurity. Singapore HAD to do what it did in order to survive. South Korea felt the same. Certainly, this has played a factor in getting over the “Wall”
    @Ollumi – While all societies have class stratification, Korea, and in my opinion, Singapore had less so. Compared to the rest of Asia, the poor in Singapore have it a lot better than the poor in the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. The government polices on housing, education and work have made even the poorest people in Singapore better off than most poor people in other Asian countries. I believe it can be said the same for HK.
    As for Hong Kong and Singapore, I believe there are two important factors. Size. It is much easier to administer relativity small populations in small geographic areas. Secondly, and I know I may get flack here, Both Hong Kong and Singapore had strong traditions of British Administration that they adapted to thier needs with the goals of overall societal development.
    @ Two Fish – Westerners can easily separate their own opinions from that of the actions of their government. We have not been brainwashed to believe that our government IS ourselves. This ability of disassociation allows to be able objectively look at our government and society and to critic its strengths and flaws. Something not easily done in China where deference to authority is primary to a good idea. Certainly the points you raise about the US economy are valid. We are well aware of them. But unlike Chinese, we don’t lose face over it when someone criticizes us for our governments failure to manage the economy properly. So opinions about the Chinese economy from western economist are not made invalid just because the US government failed to listen to those economist in the first place.

  • Twofish

    ollumi: Speaking in very general terms, Korean Chaebol’s fuels their growth through exports. Chinese SOE’s fuels their growth through monopolistic domestic practices
    I don’t think this is an accurate description. You do have industries in which all of the major players are state-owned, but they do compete with each other, and in the case of most industries, I don’t think that you can argue that the prices that the SOE end up charging are higher than would be charged if the SOE’s were private.
    Chris: Secondly, and I know I may get flack here, Both Hong Kong and Singapore had strong traditions of British Administration that they adapted to thier needs with the goals of overall societal development.
    I really agree here. Also you might ask where the British got their administrative traditions from, and it came from the East India Company, which they copied the Chinese mandarin system. Also while the British colonial system is part of the story, it obviously since the whole thing. Singapore and Hong Kong are doing fine, but Uganda and Pakistan are not.
    I happen to like the British administrative system. I really like the way that Hong Kong works.
    But the fact remains that they were not and are not liberal democracies, and in fact the heavy role of the judiciary in both Hong Kong and Singapore were in large part set up to prevent anything like democracy from happening. It’s also noteworthy that despite all of the talk of “rule of law” that in both Hong Kong and Singapore the government had draconian powers which they used to stop dissent.
    Chris: Something not easily done in China where deference to authority is primary to a good idea.
    Public deference to authority is required, but my experience is that as long as you make it obvious that you are “loyal” then private criticism is quite welcome.
    Once the Party-State has decided what to do, then it’s time to shut up and just nod your head. But the question of the long term economic future of China is a topic that is not closed and not decided.
    The other thing is that sometimes there are political restrictions on the arguments that you can make, but you can usually get around them. In Chinese discussions, it’s almost impossible to say something good about Japan, so people talk about South Korea. Similarly, a lot of the reaction to the financial crisis was copied from China. The bailout of General Motors was pretty much a carbon copy of the SOE restructuring that China did, and I have it on good authority the people really studied China and used it as a template for the US.
    But it’s politically impossible in the US to admit that you are copying China, so people talked about Canada and Sweden, and when that didn’t work, they just did stuff without talking about where the idea came from.
    Chris: . So opinions about the Chinese economy from western economist are not made invalid just because the US government failed to listen to those economist in the first place.
    But that’s not the problem. The problem is that the US *did* listen to that sort of advice, and it’s turned into a big mess. All of the people that were talking about liberalizing markets and “economic reform” were pushing the US toward a system that no one cares to defend anymore.
    You can’t have it both ways. If you are trying to argue that the US has never listened to the advice of economists that advocate open markets, then there is no reason for China to care about what they say since what they’ve advocated has never been tried. If you are trying to argue that the US has listened to the advice of the economists that advocate free markets, then they have some part to play with the Lehman collapse and the mess that the US is in.
    There are people that passionate believe in free markets, and I respect that. The trouble is that they have yet to come up with a story about what happened that makes sense. Also, I respect people that learn from their mistakes. If you can show me an economist that says “boy, I really messed up with the advice I had in 2005″ I’m more likely to listen to them. But I haven’t see any economist come up and say “Boy, I really messed up” and I worry about taking advice from people that seem incapable of error. (And if you want me to be open about how I messed up. I severely underestimated the amount of government intervention that would have been needed to prop up the economy in 2009. Paul Krugman was right and I was wrong.)

  • Twofish

    One other thing, if you want me to explain why Mexico stagnated whereas China grew, the key difference is domestic savings. Mexico has very little domestic savings which means that for economic growth, it has to rely on foreign investment which can be extremely fickle. As far as why there is no savings. One big difference is that in China, if all else fails you can put your money in a matress, and after a decade or so, it’s still worth something. In Mexico, if you put your money in a matress in Mexico in 1980, it would have ended up totally worthless.
    China has huge amount of domestic savings which leads to a virtuous cycle where economic growth creates savings which creates economic growth. The thing about savings is that if you have a ton of savings, you can afford to do stupid things and not have the system blow up. If you don’t have any savings, then one mistake and everything blows up, and being human, you will make some mistake.

  • Tim

    Twofish: This is a useless statement, since *by definition* the quality of the institution is defined as “that which makes a country not-poor.”
    Can’t agree with this definition. Institutions are not necessarily focused on making a country ‘not-poor.’ Institutions generally have very specific mandates and they do not have to be directly tied to wealth. The quality of these institutions are generally determined by how effectively they are able to accomplish their objectives.
    Twofish: I don’t agree with the idea that growth-generating innovation is inherently a domain of small companies.
    He does not suggest that large firms cannot drive innovation; rather that a significant source of innovation is being ignored. I suspect, that Mihov is alluding to the economic impact that SME’s have on developed economies – they do not get the press of the larger players but they are often the largest source of nonfarm GDP that is often spurred by innovation.

  • http://chinabystander.wordpress.com China Bystander

    Thanks, as ever, for the kind words about China Bystander.
    One thing about both South Korea and Singapore is that they are small. The Great Wall number is a per capita GDP one and the magnitude of the denominator may be more significant than the size of the numerator. China may turn out to have too long a tail of poor people.
    To Tom’s point on South Korea making critical changes in the 1980s, the politics probably changed along with, or even ahead of the economics. For whatever reason, the grip of the chaebols was broken at just the right moment.
    –CB

  • Twofish

    Also I’m looking at the Great Wall numbers and they don’t seem to make sense. The first problem is that there is no reason to believe that strong institutions make rich countries instead of rich countries make strong institutions.
    The second problem is that the graph is institutional quality versus income graph, whereas the real test is institutional quality versus income growth. If Milhov is correct, then you should see countries with poor governance records stall in growth when they reach $12000. What’s interesting is that just doesn’t seem to be happening. Thailand and Mexico seem stuck, but Turkey, Russia, and Malaysia have been registering decent amounts of economic growth.
    One other thing that I find interesting is that their numbers are from 2007. It would be interesting to see how “good governance” interacted with the financial crisis.

  • http://xxxxx Marcus Totenberg

    Good or fair institutions are not distributed evenly in mid-size or large countries. For example, the Po Valley of Italy has securely achieved developed-nation status and produced world-class corporations in certain niche industries, some other corners of the country have not quite done so. A reading of the book “the Moral Basis of a Backward Society” (by Edward Banfield) will be relevant here.
    If such disparity could co-exist inside a mid-size country, what about a continent-size nation with 20 times larger population? I will not be surprised if limited, pockets (but only pockets) of regions in China surpass the bottleneck during the coming decades.

  • http://Www.inpraiseofchina.com Godfree roberts

    A significant factor worth mentioning is the honesty and competence of top decision-makers.
    Lee had his elitist failings but was and presumably still is both honest and competent, to Singapore’s great benefit. The Filipinos have not had either quality in their leadership for any sustained period. The US leadership currently suffers–thanks to shameful “campaign contribution” laws–from an absence of both.
    China’s senior leadership demonstrates both qualities. Both Hu and Xi, his successor, have demonstrated these critical qualities since boyhood and their confreres appear to be of equal moral stature. Even if the lower levels of their bureaucracy are less honest than, say, their US counterparts, the leadership is able to go over their heads to effectively address the people and bring them into alignment with broad policy goals.
    BTW, there is a real question as to whether the planet can afford the resources that would be necessary to move 1.3 billion people past a $12,000 annual lifestyle. Their government has been fairly upfront about this in projecting a “moderately prosperous” future for the country.

  • Twofish

    The other thing is to look back at the 1990′s and read reports from people like the AEI and Heritage Foundation talking about how great Mexico was going to become and how Singapore was doomed. Mexico was going to be great because it just went through a round of privatizations whereas Singapore had heavy government interference in the economy and was “overinvesting.”
    Something that I find interesting is that hardly anyone ever says “I was wrong.” And it’s interesting to see how people react with the facts turn against them. The two typical things that I hear when the facts turn against people are “I’m right just not yet” and “Nobody knows.”
    The problem is that “I’m right, just not yet” and “Nobody knows” are unacceptable answers in economics.
    The problem with “I’m right, just not yet” is that *when* and *how* something is going to happen is the most important piece of information, and without knowing *when* and *how* something is going to happen, the information is useless. I *know* that the Chinese economy is going to collapse someday. I know this because human institutions are impermanent and the sun is going to burn out someday. I also know that I’m going to die someday, but it’s *when* and *how* that is important. If someone tells me that I’m going to die tomorrow if I don’t do something, I’ll turn my life around to do that. If someone tells me that I’m going to die in fifty years if I don’t do something, then it doesn’t matter since I’m going to die anyway.
    The problem with “Nobody knows” is that statement is equally useless. If you say that large SOE’s *might* cause innovation to decrease by crowding out SME’s, then a counterargument is “it is *might not*.” Also, if you don’t know, then *find out*. Also sometimes whether a policy is wise or disastrous depends on a specific piece of information. For example, the massive amount of loans that happened in 2007 *will* result in NPL’s. If the total bill comes to US$250 billion, then it’s excellent policy. If the total bill comes to US$4 trillion, then it’s a disaster. So coming up with a number (and doing what you can to minimize that number) is pretty critical. (BTW, the numbers that people are coming up with are between US$500 billion and US$1 trilllion, which is acceptable.)
    I try as much as possible to avoid playing the “I’m right just not yet” game and the “Nobody knows” game. One way I do this is that I can tell you right now that there is something that I believe and some prediction that I’m making that will look utterly stupid in a few years. I wish I knew which prediction and belief it was, and one thing that I try to do is to test my beliefs against the data so that *when* I find what that I’m wrong about something important, it can be fixed without causing too much damage.

  • perspectivehere

    Dan wrote: “In a recent Wall Street Journal article, entitled, “Is Mexico China’s Future,” Bob Davis also talks of the difficulty emerging countries have in reaching developed status and notes that ‘Singapore and South Korea are nearly alone in having made the transition.’”
    The WSJ does not mention that Singapore pursues a “state capitalism” model as it does not fit in WSJ’s free-market ideology. From Wikipedia: “The economy of Singapore is dominated by government-linked corporations that produce as much as 60% of the country’s GDP. These government-linked companies are owned by a government holding agency, Temasek Holdings. Notable Government-linked corporations include Singapore Airlines, SingTel, ST Engineering, MediaCorp and Singapore Temasek Holdings.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government-owned_corporation#Singapore
    Singapore and South Korea are two countries whose state-led policies are highlighted in Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang’s book, “Bad Samaritans – The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism” (http://www.amazon.com/Bad-Samaritans-Secret-History-Capitalism/dp/1596913991) and cited as examples of successful economic development that fly in the face of free-market fundamentalism.
    A review and summary of the book can be found here:
    http://www.atlanticfreepress.com/reviews/3678-bad-samaritans–the-myth-of-free-trade-and-the-secret-history-of-capitalism–review-by-jim-miles.html
    Ha Joon Chang is quoted here on Singapore:
    “It’s more a research methodology than a tool, but I’ve learned much from looking at the economics of real societies and comparing them across time and space. The real world does not operate in a way that economic models would predict – life is often stranger than fiction. My favourite example is Singapore. It’s famous for its free trade and welcoming attitude towards foreign investors but in many ways it’s a socialist country, with all the land publicly owned, 85% of housing provided by the government-owned housing corporation, and more than 20% of national output produced by state-owned enterprise. It is a perfect example of both the limitations of economic theory and the pragmatic mixture that is needed in the real world – anyone trying to invent an economic system on the basis of a particular theory would not invent Singapore’s economy. Real-word analysis wakes you up from your hidden assumptions and helps sharpen your theory.”
    http://www.research-horizons.cam.ac.uk/insideout/-p-dr-ha-joon-chang–p-.aspx
    Hong Kong is also quite “socialist” despite its reputation for free-market – 50% of the population live in government-provided housing, and low cost quality public healthcare is available for any permanent resident.
    It seems to me China would like to follow in the footsteps of Singapore’s pragmatic model. Certainly provision of public housing is one way to promote social stability, while permitting ownership of government subsidized housing provides a store of wealth. Singapore wisely allows citizens to use their retirement funds for purchases of government-provided flats.
    Prior to the reforms of 1980′s there was no private housing in China and everyone lived in state-provided housing. The creation of the private housing market has meant the growth of personal wealth tied to one’s home, but how does a country maintain a healthy private market in housing while providing decent housing to those who cannot afford it? This is a fundamental question and solving it is crucial to sustained economic development.

  • perspectivehere

    Further to the discussion on provision of housing, it seems to me that regardless of the state of a country’s GDP, when people are homeless or living in very substandard housing, they cannot participate in a country’s economy, whether as a consumer or in a productive capacity.
    One of my favorite games is Monopoly. The game starts off radically socialist, even communist – every player gets $1,500 (no economic birthright or advantages to anyone or discrimination on racial, ethnic or gender inequality). The other “socialist” element is that everyone who passes “Go” gets $200, regardless of whether one owns any property. The rest of the game is pretty much pure capitalism – each player buys up land and tries to get a monopoly so it can build properties, and then asset inflation come with high rents. Eventually, there is a big gap between rich and poor, as those with choice properties and hotels charge massive rents, while those with no properties and cannot afford high rents go bankrupt and drop out of the game. Eventually when everyone drops out but one, the game is over.
    This is depressingly the tendency in the real world as well. In the U.S., where you wind up if you lose the housing game is in a homeless shelter, living besides a dumpster or in jail. According to Wikipedia, about 1 in 200 people in the U.S. spent time in a homeless shelter in 2009. These “losers” at the property game become big problems for a society, and effectively government becomes responsible for bearing the costs of the social consequences of homelessness.
    Countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea realize this and have focused their efforts on solving their housing problems and ensuring adequate and affordable housing.
    http://chartercities.org/blog/77/housing-in-hong-kong-singapore-and-korea-richard-green-usc
    “Hong Kong’s early housing policy is peculiar because it was the diametric opposite of its economic policy. The Hong Kong government generally took a laissez-faire approach to the economy, maintaining unusually open trade and capital flows. But beginning with the Shek Kip Mei fire of 1953, the government intervened considerably in the housing market, clearing slums and building high-rise public housing. The government did a number of things that are generally anathema to economists: it constructed buildings and heavily subsidized both rents and home purchases for low-income people.”
    The construction program was ambitious – about half of all dwelling units in Hong Kong are public – and it ran into considerable criticism. Like all subsidized housing schemes, the benefits are not necessarily well-targeted, and production was prone to locational and physical inefficiencies…..Despite these inefficiencies, housing conditions in Hong Kong improved dramatically in a short period of time. The city saw a sharp increase in both the share of people living in adequate housing and average dwelling space per capita.”
    ….
    “To say Singapore is a unique economic and housing success story is an understatement. The city offers a rare case of a thriving centrally managed economy. Despite its one party rule, Singapore is ranked by Transparency International as the fourth least corrupt country in the world. While Singapore cannot teach us everything about housing development, it does offer a few lessons – lessons the Chinese have learned. Public ownership of land is pervasive in Singapore. According to Hwang (2008), around 85 percent of households live in housing units built on government owned land. Most households own their units, and the units are traded actively in the secondary market.”
    ….
    “Unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, Korea’s housing development lagged economic development. In the early 1990s, while on the verge of becoming an OECD country, the ratio of households to housing units in Seoul was nearly 2 to 1. The lack of supply in the face of increasing affluence put Korean policymakers in a bind. Housing became very expensive in Korea, with price to income ratios as high as 10 in Seoul. The government released very limited amounts of land for new housing in the decades after the Korean War. As a result, Korea’s supply of land for development remained inelastic and shifted out a little bit from year to year. One of the reasons for the limited land supply was the government’s desire to steer capital towards plant and equipment investment in export-oriented manufacturing.
    Once the government decided to improve housing conditions, it allowed the supply of land for development to become more elastic, even though this would hurt the wealth position of existing homeowners and therefore seemed politically problematic. Nevertheless, the government decided to move forward. The results were striking: floor area per capita doubled within 20 years, and the share of units with an interior flush toilet rose from 18 percent to 87 percent.”
    It seems to me that since the Reagan / Thatcher era, the Anglo-American world has been overly blinded by free-market fundamentalism that discourages governments from undertaking housing programs, like this article shows: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allison-kilkenny/free-market-enthusiasts-p_b_360400.html. Or using arguments that housing subsidies to poor residents robs the middle class, like this: http://mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=105, which ignores the fact that the social costs of homelessness may far outweigh the cost of subsidies.
    China’s government would do well to continue its socialist tradition of meeting basic living standards for everyone and reducing poverty, while also developing markets as a pricing mechanism and productive engine of growth. This will assure its long-term economic future.

  • Thomas Parker

    Ask any ex-pat who lives in China what they see for China’s future and none of them will say they see it becoming another Japan in terms of wealth. The reason is simple, China does not innovate. It makes what others tell it to make and that is pretty much it. When other countries out-price China on this, things will change here and not in a good way either. Unless China changes radically, I expect it to hit a Thailand/Mexico/Ukraine type wall and then that will be it.

  • Mi Fu

    Just returned from a vacation in Mexico and my conclusion that culture is an important factor for economic development.
    It is nothing new that the Confucianist-influenced states focus very much on education and have a economic-friendly work attitude.
    In Mexico development is hindered by the “Manana-attitude” and a general very low status of education of the general population.
    The confucianist culture and a government that focuses very much on economic development are factors that are very much in favor of China.
    Will China reach a per capita GDP like Japan or the USA?
    This would require a complete transformation of the way humans produce and consume. With the nowadays pattern of production and consumption, our earth simply does not provide sufficient resources.
    This does not mean that it is not possible. In contradiction to some comments above: Chinese and Chinese enterprises can be very creative. If a transformation to a sustainable form of economy will take place, it is much more likely in China than in the USA and Japan.

  • Evan

    I suggest you have a look at this: http://www.flyandsting.com/post/12458641674/who-will-buy-the-china-is-a-myth
    I am bearish on China.