Five Things About China Deals That Differ From The West. Aspiration Matters.
Geraldine Johns-Putra over at the View to China blog (just added it to our blogroll) just did a post I really love, called, "Ten things about doing deals in China that are different from the West – Part 1." I love it both because it is helpful and because it does a great job of expressing some of the peculiarities of deals in China.
1. The Sino-foreign joint venture. Ms. Johns-Putra's take on these is that negotiating these often becomes "more adversarial than it should because it feels like two parties are trying to carve out their individual niches and protect their own turfs. It can be easy to forget that the point of the exercise is to provide the basis for the ongoing management and governance (and success) of the jointly-held company."
I completely agree that negotiating joint ventures often becomes adversarial, but I also think that is often necessary and in some ways can actually be a good thing. Better to know before going into a joint venture that it is not going to work than to learn about it only later. For more on the difficulty of doing joint ventures in China, check out the following:
-- China Joint Ventures Again. This Time We Blame The Victims.
-- Love The One You're With. When China Joint Ventures Make Sense.
-- China's Joint Venture Jeopardy
2. Rigid capital and profit distribution structures. Ms. Johns-Putra has this to say about the rigidity of joint ventures:
Along the way, a foreigner discovers that certain issues are pretty rigid in China, especially when it comes to the Sino-foreign joint venture model. One of them is the capital structure and how much one can derive from the investment relative to one’s investment. Indeed, one obstacle that private equity firms found investing in China is that the Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture structure requires that profits be distributed in accordance with the proportion of equity holdings. If you own 50% of the company, you get 50% of the profits.
She's right and what she says here applies to much of Chinese law, in that it is much more formalistic and rigid as compared to the West.
3. Reciprocity in negotiations. Ms. Johns-Putra does a great job explaining this one, which really does require a full explanation:
I confess I used to find this one amusing. I think it is less and less an issue, as Chinese counter-parties become more sophisticated and are less demanding of complete reciprocity in a contract. Some years ago, however, it was not unusual that a Chinese counter-party, when asked to provide a certain undertaking, would insist on a reciprocal undertaking by the foreign investor to ensure “fairness”. At times, the request didn’t make sense, e.g. when the foreign investor requested that the Chinese enterprise provide warranties regarding its assets because it was buying them from the Chinese. Why should the buyer then provide a warranty on its assets?? Often, however, reciprocal undertakings are easy to give away, since they have no real meaning anyway. (And from a philosophical viewpoint, in a negotiation, should you really be asking for something you would not give anyway?)
I too have had to deal with this issue in drafting contacts with Chinese companies, only I never found it amusing. I am a perfectionist and I have always believed contracts should not contain any meaningless provisions. My fear is that what should be seen as a meaningless provision will not be so viewed by a judge or arbitrator who will (rightfully) believe that it could not have been put in the contract for no reason, and then will seek to interpret it to have meaning. And that meaning may not be the meaning I want. This is still a problem and the reason is because so often Chinese companies skimp on their lawyers and demanding whatever the other side gets (no matter whether it makes sense or not) is a classic sign of a bad lawyer.
4. Demands based on fear of the other. Again, I will quote Ms. Johns-Putra directIy:
I put into this category demands about governing law and the dispute resolution forum. Many foreign clients I have known had a fear of submitting to Chinese law and agreeing to dispute resolution in China. Many Chinese parties seemed to feel exactly the same way about foreign laws and foreign arbitration and courts. There is more to this than I can go into here, but essentially agreeing to arbitration or even the jurisdiction of a court in China is not such a bad idea, since (i) arbitration at the China-based China International Economic Trade and Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) is easier to enforce than a foreign arbitration award which can be simply ineffectual in China (just ask Danone) and (ii) foreign court judgments mean nothing if the Chinese party does not have assets in that jurisdiction. Governing language clauses also fall into this category. If a foreign investor is willing to submit to the jurisdiction of a Chinese court, then it follows that the Chinese language version should govern, since the court will not read anything else. For many years, I used to automatically provide for both English and Chinese language versions to prevail, but I am no longer convinced this is workable. You can find much more on this issue over at the China Law Blog, and I am indebted to them for making such good sense about these issues so many times that it convinced me they were right.
I agree with all of the above.
What I am always saying regarding the official language of a contract is that it is always better to agree on one language than two languages just greatly increases the chances for misunderstandings and attorneys' fees should a dispute arise. For more on why one language is so much better than two, check out "China OEM Agreements. Why Ours Are In Chinese. Flat Out."
5. Agreeing to agree. Again, I have to just quote Ms. Johns-Putra directly, British spellings and all:
Another personal favourite of mine, like the reciprocity requirement, chiefly because this had some lessons for me. Many China-related contracts I’ve drafted contain a clause that there are outstanding issues that the parties haven’t yet entirely resolved and would agree on in time. Often, the clause — or at least the principle — is handy when there is just some little detail the parties can’t quite agree on but feel like they’ve had enough and need to move on and sign the thing. In the English system of law, clauses that don’t pin down an obligation on a party are called “agreements to agree," and they are generally seen as worthless. Yet, I have drafted many contracts with “agreeing to agree” clauses like that, that never needed to be readdressed. The main thing is the deal got done and everyone moved on. Plus, I’ve drafted “amendment agreements” so many times, that I know that even if parties have agreed on something, they can change their minds or need to clarify things after the fact. It is just human nature. So maybe the Chinese are onto something when they recognise it upfront and don’t try and dot every “i” and cross every “t”.
This was actually my favorite of the list because it was one that initially drove me crazy, but with which I have learned to deal and even sometimes appreciate. It is so non-Western and Western lawyers tend to really hate it because it is so counter to our training. It actually comes up all the time. Here are a few somewhat composite examples:
1. Large, well funded Chinese company needs US technology to improve its quality and increase its sales. It contacts our client wanting to do a joint venture. Our client, quite wisely I think, wants to go into China more slowly so instead agrees to license out a few of its products to the Chinese company. The licensing is a way for our client to make good money in the short term, while at the same time, it serves as a great mechanism to determine whether this Chinese company is one with whom it wants to and should be getting closer. We draft the licensing agreement and the Chinese adds a number of provisions talking about how if the two companies do well with their licensing agreement, they will form a joint venture along such and such terms.
My sophisticated client and its in-house lawyer are completely non-plussed by this language. The in-house lawyer wants it removed completely, rightly fearing that whatever language is in there is an open invitation for a law suit if a joint venture never happens. The client itself, however, rightly feels that simply stripping it out will be deemed an insult to the Chinese company and go contradict much of what they had been discussing and one of the purposes for the joint venture.
I agree with the in-house counsel that such provisions are dangerous and I talk about how if we are going to sign off on the language the Chinese company has put forth, we really ought to draft up and negotiate an entire "tentative" joint venture agreement. But that makes no sense at all because, as I point out, my firm does not offer a "tentative" discount and so the drafting and negotiating of such a joint venture agreement will cost no less than a "real" joint venture agreement and joint venture agreements are expensive. In fact, in deference to #1 above, joint venture agreements are pretty much the only agreement we seldom do on a flat fee basis and the reason for that is that they are so unpredictable in terms of how much attorney time they will require due to the impossibility of predicting how contentious they will be.
So instead, I propose we replace the two pages of the Chinese company with something along the lines of how both parties hope this agreement will allow them to get to know each other well enough such that they will want to strengthen their relationship with future ventures. We did this, the Chinese company was fine with it, and we achieved Kumbaya
We represented a large US service business that had a very successful multi-year working relationship with a Chinese counterpart. The American company would bring on its Chinese counterpart most of the time when it had China-based work and the Chinese company would do the same when it had US-based work. But one day the Chinese company proclaimed that it wanted to "formalize" its relationship with the American company. I do not think the Chinese company used the word "formalize" but that was certainly the gist of what it was saying it wanted.
Our American client was vehemently opposed to formalizing the relationship. The American company loved its relationship with the Chinese company, but felt that in at least a few areas, it was not the best Chinese company to use. The American company also saw no benefit to changing the relationship because it had been working so incredibly well and seamlessly and it worried that negotiating and putting it all on paper risked doing it harm. As things stood, the US company simply paid the Chinese companies regular rates whenever it brought it on and everyone was happy with the financial aspects of that relationship. Lastly, the American company was concerned that if it formalized its relationship with the Chinese company, it would look strange if it did not reflect that relationship in some way on its website, and it did not want to do that for fear of offending some of the other Chinese companies with which it also did business.
Yet at the same time, our American client was scared to death that if it said no to "formalizing," it would lead to the end of a great relationship.
At this point, I will admit that in both of the two above examples (and probably in every other one in which I have been involving aspirational language) at least one person has always sought to analogize the situation to dancing at a prom, dating, going steady, or going to bed with someone. I note this but also note that I have refrained from resorting to such language in this post.
So I suggested we seek to figure out what the Chinese company really wanted from this relationship and that my law firm do the talking with them as we could do so in a more neutral less emotional way and we could do so in Chinese. So we talked with the head people at the Chinese company and learned that their goal was more than anything a desire to commemorate/memorialize/recognize their excellent relationship with the US firm --yes, commemorate/memorialize/recognize are the words I am meaning to use here. The Chinese firm wanted to do this for the following reasons:
-- as a way of showing the American company how happy they were with the relationship;
-- so they could brag to their Chinese clients and potential Chinese clients that they had an affiliation with a top American company
-- so that their employees and potential employees would know that they had an affiliation with an American company.
So working with the Chinese company, we were, in very short order, able to draft up a two page document the Chinese company absolutely loved and yet had virtually no legal impact. The document merely started out talking about how great the relationship had been and how both sides wanted it to continue. The document talked about how the parties would continue to try to refer appropriate work to each other and work on matters together, when appropriate. It concluded by talking about how the parties hoped that their relationship would continue to grow and prove financially sound for the two of them. The two companies got together for a great dinner with a lot of toasts and signed the document.
This was at least three years ago and every "aspiration" in this document (note how I did not say contract) has been fulfilled. Such a document would be pretty much unheard of in the West where everyone is super sensitive to legal entanglements and, in a perfect world, I would have counseled my client against signing it as well in that it violates the rule I discussed above about legally meaningless provisions. But in the real world, business exigencies, not ultra paranoid lawyers, do and should drive business and using "aspirational language" can be a great way to solidify relationships in Asia (we have done similar things with companies in Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Russia -- which is in many ways more "Asian" than "Western" in how it conducts business).
Don't want to sound like too much of a geek, but I can hardly wait for Ms. Putra to come out with part II.
What do you think?

Comments (8)
Read through and enter the discussion by using the form at the endTwofish - March 4, 2010 11:19 AM
I can think of two situations under Chinese law where an agreement to agree would have legal impact.
There are a lot of provisions of Chinese law in which there is a rule that gets applied unless the parties agree otherwise (take any Chinese law and search for "unless otherwise agreed"). By putting in a statement that there is no agreement, the contract keeps those provisions from kicking in.
The other issue is "good faith". Chinese law is based on German law which has a very wide definition of "good faith" in executing a contract, whereas Anglo-American law only applies the concept of "good faith" in the formation of the contract rather than in its execution. What can happen under Chinese/German law is that if there is a dispute, one party can accuse the other party of not acting in "good faith" and can get the court to reinterpret the contract. By having a clause that shows that there was no agreement on a topic when the contract was formed, then if the parties start arguing about it afterwards, then you don't have grounds are arguing "lack of good faith."
Twofish - March 4, 2010 11:32 AM
Also the fact that Anglo-American law doesn't have a "good faith" concept makes it much more dangerous to draw an aspirational contract in the United States than in Continental law. English lawyers tend to look strictly at the contract and to not inquire much into the motives of the parties. So if you write a contract under English law, and it has a clause that is bad for you later, it's hard to revoke.
By contrast, if an aspirational contract under Continental law has a bad clause, then the courts will look at the motives of the parties, and it's unlikely that clause will be enforced. Conversely, the fact that everyone is smiles can be taken as evidence that the parties are acting in "good faith" which may be important in later disputes.
The other thing is that one has to be careful in isolating *why* something is different.
The fact that China and the United States are different in some way may not be an Western/Eastern thing but a English-law/German-law, developed country/developing country, US/rest of the world, China/rest of the world thing, place with reliable courts/place without reliable courts thing.
It's interesting for example, how Russia somehow becomes Asian, while in other contexts Japan becomes Western.
Matthew - March 4, 2010 5:53 PM
I agree completely with the comment that foreign clients should not fear mainland arbitration. I believe that I made this point here quite recently. My tactic with this one has been for the client to initially raise as an issue in neogiations but then to concede on it, either as a gesture of good faith or in return for a reciprocal concession.
Twofish - March 4, 2010 6:59 PM
Some people are soccer fans. Some people are Star Trek fans. I'm a comparative law junkie.....
There is a reason why Chinese companies have very rigid capital structures. Suppose you have a state-owned enterprise that needs to raise capital and the owners (i.e. the Chinese government) want to sell 10% of the company. If the PRC had a flexible capital structure, then what could happen, and would likely would happen is that you put $10 million in the SOE, and then next day, the board of the company issues "magic shares" to the CEO's brother-in-law, and you never see a cent of your money back.
Chinese law requires rigid capital structures, so that if the owner (i.e. the government) takes money out, you get 10% of however much money gets taken out. This also explains why you'd invest in the company even though you have zero control over the operations of the company. The majority shareholder doesn't have to act in your interests, all you have to do is to make sure that the majority shareholder acts in their interests. They make whatever money they can, they keep 90% and you get your 10%.
You might ask whether the majority shareholder will find some other loophole that will leave you with nothing, and the answer is that they might if the law lets them. In this sort of situation you want laws that are rigid, formalistic, and inflexible that way that there is less chance for funny business, and that way even if you are cheated, you *know* you've been cheated.
If you had laws that required a judge to interpret, then you have to trust that the judge will do so fairly, and if the laws are subject to interpretation, you have no way of knowing whether the judge is cheating you. If the laws are rigid and inflexible and you throw it to a judge to interpret, then either the judge rules for you, or else it's obvious to everyone that there is funny business going on. Note that this is a problem even if you have a fair and honest judge, because if the laws are ambiguous, it's difficult for a judge to prove to you whether they are being fair and honest, whereas if the laws are clear and unambiguous, then it's possible for the judges to more easily demonstrate their fairness.
Matthew - March 4, 2010 10:15 PM
Two Fish,
I would tend to agree that good faith is not overly strong in Anglo contract law (here I generally refer to UK, HK, Australia and similar jurisdictions) but it certainly applies in respect of specific contracts (insurance is an example) and relationships (trusts).
Aspirational contracts still face the problem that the common law distinguishes between agreements and an indication of an intention to agree. That is a fundamental principle that, at the very least, runs through Anglo common law. Given how fundamental this rule is I am not sure that a strong doctrine of good faith would remedy this.
Aspirational clauses can be enforceable or at least form the basis of an action in some jurisdictions as a misleading representation. That provides another basis as to why Dan is right to ensure such clauses don't get in merely for the sake of placating the other party.
Twofish - March 5, 2010 7:27 AM
Dan: Such a document would be pretty much unheard of in the West where everyone is super sensitive to legal entanglements.
I think these sorts of documents are quite common in the West. They are called press releases.
http://www.free-press-release.com/news-synygy-and-health-market-science-form-strategic-partnership-1264677469.html
I think what is happening is that when you are in a multi-national environment, lawyers get called to do things (i.e. draft a press release) that they wouldn't normally do in a domestic environment.
Geraldine Johns-Putra - March 5, 2010 2:24 PM
I should make clear that I would not advocate putting something into a contract that neither party was prepared to go through with, but was in there just because deal fatigue had set in and maybe one party hoped it would never get noticed.
The point I was trying to make, but perhaps didn't get across adequately, was that there are areas where you might not get agreement on every point, but they are areas where full agreement on all the points are not key to signing the deal. In such a case, I think that setting out principles or a general direction can be helpful. Under English law, you may not have sufficient certainty to have a valid contract on the issue. The Chinese however are a lot more prepared to do this and it may have its basis in the larger good faith doctrine to which Twofish has alluded.
Clearly there are risks to such an approach, under Chinese law or English law. As a lawyer, you must explain this to the client. But my clients tend to be rational and pretty smart and understand the issues. I guess I'm lucky.
This brings me back to what I said in my original post and I do stand by what I said for this very reason. Sometimes as a lawyer you need to appreciate the commercial issues, use your judgment and trust your client to use his or hers, once you've explained things. As a transactional lawyer, I see this as being a crucial part of my role.
And I have to say I'm glad to have engendered quite a lot of discussion on this!
Twofish - March 7, 2010 8:24 PM
One thing about contracts is that there is an underlying tension between enforcing the contract as written and trying to achieve a "fair and just" result even if means having a judge rewrite the contract. The problem is that if you give the judge the ability to rewrite a contract to make it "fair and just" you also decrease the amount of predictability in the contract.
Different legal systems will handle things in different ways. English courts (and those in Hong Kong) as well as French courts will tend to enforce the contract as written to make things predictable even if it leads to a bad result. German, US, and mainland Chinese courts will tend to reinterpret and rewrite the contract in order to achieve a fair result even if you lose predictability.
This isn't a civil/common law distinction. US commercial law is based on the UCC which has some elements of German civil law, and if you look at the influences on mainland Chinese law, you end up with a German foundation, with heavy borrowing of US and Taiwanese concepts, all of which result on a strong element of "good faith."
One thing that *is* a civil/common law distinction is that general principles in civil law are extremely important, whereas in common law they are generally meaningless.
One other thing in international transactions is that when dealing with people from different cultures and different legal systems, a lot boils down to basic human decency and honesty. Even if you aren't an expert in the law, you can often get very far by convincing people that you are a good guy and the person you have a conflict with isn't, or if you both can convince whoever is mediating the dispute that you both are good guys and you just need some third party to break an impasse.
What's curious about a lot of commercial transaction is how often you get a "friendly dispute." Not every commercial argument because a screaming grudge match, and often you have two companies that agree to the principles and just need an impartial third party to fill in the gaps. What's curious is the attitudes of the courts to these sorts of cases. English and American judges *hate* being mediators, and will do everything they can to make sure that you settle these sorts of disputes outside of court. If you try to get an English or American court to be a "marriage counsellor", the judge will make both parties regret it.
By contrast, mainland Chinese judges are quite willing to be mediators in these types of disputes. I think this is because of two reasons. The first is that the Chinese judiciary is pretty weak, and Chinese judges like it when people find them useful. The second reason is that the Chinese Party-state would prefer people to handle disputes through the state apparatus rather than to go outside the court system, because by having a judge handle the dispute the Party-state has some input over the outcome, whereas this would not be true if people went totally outside court system.