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John Pomfret As China Basher? What Is A Superpower Anyway?

Posted by Dan on July 30, 2008 at 03:37 PM

Did a post earlier today, entitled, "China As Superpower. Yes Or No" on a "debate" between John Pomfret and China Comment regarding whether or not China will become a superpower. Got a comment to that post from Mark Anthony Jones, author of the book, Flowing Waters Never Stale, that is too long and too well thought out to remain as a comment. So I am taking that comment and putting it in a post here. Please note that all of the following is in Mr. Jones's words, not mine:

Pomfret says that he isn't a "China-basher" but one of his constantly reoccuring themes is that China will not become a "superpower" for a very long time, and so Americans need not live in fear of losing their global hegemonic status. I have a lot of problems with this kind of silly discourse.

Firstly, what is a "superpower"? The former Soviet Union was always described as a "superpower", as one of the world's "two great superpowers", etc. Yet overall living standards there never reached the levels currently enjoyed by China's growing middle classes. Consumer choice was always extremely limited, people enjoyed no free press, no parliamentary democracy, no real rule of law, etc. The Soviet Union was considered a "superpower" because of the threatening size of its military might, and because it used this might to spread its influence around the globe in direct competition with the United States, which also used its military might to spread its influence globally.

The United States, likewise, is "the" world's "superpower" today because it maintains its global economic hegemony of the world - or at least it appears to. It is not, and never has been, as "superpower" based on its general living standards. If this were the only criteria used, then the United States would currently be ranked 12th down the list - and Norway would be the world's "superpower" - that's if we were to use the UN Human Development Index as our performance indicator.

Yet Pomfret argues that China will not only be any time soon emerging as the next world's "superpower", but that is even faces a possible collapse - because, he says, it faces too many internal contradictions that will act as fetters on its ability to further develop economically. A China "trapped in transition", as Minxin Pei has similarly argued. Will Hutton also pushes this line of reasoning. Once the economy collapses, the population will rise and the CCP will be forced out of power - this is the scenario they constantly enterntain and clearly hope for.

Pomfret is right to point out these weaknesses, and it may be the case that they will be difficult to overcome - that they will prevent China from maintaining a speedy development, though China continues to climb up the UN Human Development Index, which is a positive sign.

Although Pomfret, Pei, and Hutton all get their facts correct, the picture they paint does not amount to a balanced one of China's condition. Any purely negative account of China overlooks a lot of things that China is getting right, as Andrew Nathan explains: "the government has announced the abolition of both the household registration system, which blocked job-seeking peasants from enjoying full resident status in cities, and the 'custody and repatriation' procedure, under which the police randomly swept up and abused peasants and others who were living in cities illegally. It ended the grain tax, which contributed to the widening income gap between the countryside and urban areas. It is trying to shift more of the impetus for economic growth from export sectors to domestic consumer demand, partly by shifting more income to farmers and partly by improving the social safety net. In addition, Wen recently announced plans to provide free education nationwide through the ninth grade, improve health care in rural areas, and strengthen the protection of rural residents' property rights" - though these last three objectives have yet to come to any real fruition.

Likewise, as Andrew Nathan also points out, Pei's and Pomfret's evidence that Chinese society has become more turbulent is not proof that the regime is in danger of collapse:

"An array of actors - nongovenmental organizations pressing for official action on issues such as HIV/AIDS and the environment, legal-aid offices helping migrant workers sue companies and the government, pensioners and laid-off workers petitioning for back wages and pensions, journalists embarrassing local officials with investigations of mining accidents and land grabs - pose challenges for various levels of the party and the government. It is an open question, however, whether these forces threaten the regime or strengthen it. The interests of the central authorities are not always aligned with those of corrupt or incompetent local (or even high-level) officials. Social contention may be frightening when it boils up from beneath the surface after having been repressed for a long time, but it may still serve the survival interests of the regime if it is managed well."

The central government is not managing this situation well at present, as it is preventing petitioners from entering Beijing during the lead-up to the Olympics, and that is causing strong resentment from those who want to do just that. But what percentage of the overall population is up in arms in this way? The answer; only a minute percentage.

Minxin Pei's own research itself, ironically, testifies to the regime's proactive posture. His information on corruption and institutional weakness comes from internal party reports, state- and party-controlled newspapers, officially sponsored scholarly journals, State Planning Commission reports, state statistical yearbooks, surveys of public opinion conducted by Chinese social science institutes (whose sampling techniques, Pei should have warned readers, are seldom up to scientific standards), and Web sites such as the official Xinhua News Agency's xinhuanet.com. As Andrew Nathan has pointed out:

"The fact that institutions owned by the state and the CCP are such a rich source of information on the regime's pathologies is revealing, because although Chinese media and research institutes operate with increasing autonomy, the party still guides their work. When its guidelines are disregarded or flaunted, reporters and scholars are fired, sometimes jailed, and their publications or institutes risk being closed. It is doubtful that so many reporters and academics are evading such strictures that the regime can no longer censor them fast enough. More likely, the authorities use this stream of reporting and research to collect information on emerging problems, warn party cadres to improve their performance, and show the public that the party is acting on its concerns. It remains to be seen whether the strategy will succeed. But at least the regime is addressing the problems Pei sees, because it sees them itself."

The fact of the matter, is that China is a developing country, currently in the lower middle income range. Of course it is going to have more problems than developed countries like the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, and so on. People like Pomfret fear China, which is why they constantly look for signs of its impending collapse. The idea that a country might be able to succeed without modelling itself on Western-style Enlightenment institutions is seen as an ideological threat. The fact however, is that China is indeed developing these very institutions: the rule of law is of particular importance, and China actually performs comparitvely very well on the World Bank's measurement of Good Governance in this area, as Randall Peerenboom has noted.

Who cares whether or not China ever becomes the world's next military "superpower"? Is is really important for a country to do so? Of course not. What matters is that it continues to develop economically and socially, so that per capita living standards can continue to improve. Better to be ranked No.1 on the UN Human Development Index, than to be ranked world's No.1 "superpower". The two NEED NOT go hand in hand.

What do you think?

Comments

My favorite anecdote about the "superpower" issue has been related by James Fallows and others. Susan Shirk, an American China scholar, found that when talking to Americans about her latest title "The Fragile Superpower," they'd look shocked and ask, "fragile???". Conversely, when talking to Chinese about the same question, the response was often -- with the same shocked and puzzled expression as their American counterparts -- "superpower??"

Of course there are those ardent self-styled patriots who are swept up in visions of Chinese greatness, but the more sober and sensible types (who generally have better things to do than post comments on YouTube, on the blogs of western journalists, or on Chinese BBSs) know the scale of problems and challenges that China faces.

A few years ago, shortly after GWB's 2nd inaugural I think it was, my younger brother, who tends to be (even) more critical of Beijing than I, asked me, "If China aspires to be a great power, where's it's 'mission statement'?" I responded that it would be hard to define one: pursuing a xiaokang shehui 小康社会, a 'modestly well-off society,' was the closest thing at the time. (This was before the coinage of such great and memorable catch-phrases as "scientific sustainable development," "harmonious society," and "peaceful rise." I told my brother that he should be grateful that Beijing didn't have a "mission statement," and asked that he remember back to that awful time when, to the world's regret, it did.

Dan - the comment of mine that you have used above was actually written in a tremendous hurry this morning just before I left home for work - so forgive me for my various typing errors, and for having integrated into my text a number of large block quotes from Andrew Nathan - but I think he raises some very valid criticisms of Pei's thesis that China is "trapped in transition."

I am aware that many Chinese citizens dream of their nation one day rising up to take from America the position of world economic and military superpower, but why should the Chinese, or anybody else really care whether of not China ever reaches this level of power? A nation state does not need to be a superpower, economically (in terms of the size of its economy) or militarily, in order to achieve the best results for its citizens in terms of per capita living standards. Take a look at the UN Human Development Index. Norway is ranked No.1, followed by Iceland, followed by Australia: all three of these countries have comparitively small populations, small economies, and small military forces - yet they offer their citizens the highest quality of life, in per capita terms.

I should also like to comment briefly about China Comment's positioning on this issue. China Comment writes:

"Pomfret wanders a bit into strange territory when he argues China cannot become a superpower simply because GDP per capita is so low. But why does low per capita GDP preclude development of a strong country? If GDP is high enough, China can finance a modern military, and its state-owned businesses can purchase overseas energy and mineral resources.

With even modest GDP growth, the domestic market can serve a middle class of perhaps 400 million (or 100 million, depending on the estimate), which is larger than almost all Western countries’ populations! If China is a giant in terms of worldwide trade, it can have greater influence in trade contracts with countries like Brazil and the Central Asian nations, marginalizing the United States."

I agree with this assessment, and in fact China can already be considered a giant in terms of world trade, its global influence growing - which is precisely why the political representatives of some industries in the West encourage the production of very negative media images of China, focussing as they very often do on an exaggerated assessment of its human rights problems: they seek to brand China in a negative way so as to reduce its influence on the global stage.

In his article, Pomfret writes:

"When it comes to high-tech exports such as computers and electronic goods, 89 percent of China's exports come from non-Chinese-owned companies. China is part of the global system, but it's still the low-cost assembly and manufacturing part - and foreign, not Chinese, firms are reaping the lion's share of the profits."

Again, this goes a long way towards explaining why, in the UN, China is singled out more than any other country by developed countries for its human rights performance: many European and US based multinational corporations do not want China to successfully develop their own high-tech export industries. The rise of the Chinese brand is what they seek most to prevent, so in order to slow down China's ability to create its own successful export brands, it helps if they are able to internationally brand negatively the entire Chinese nation state.

Technology transfer has already taken place to a very large degree, in spite of the best efforts of Japanese, European and American producers to prevent it from happening, as James Kynge documented in his excellent book, "China Shakes The World". The next step then for Chinese manufacturers, is to produce their own internationally prestigious export brands - exactly what foreign-based competitors fear most!

Apart from this, as Andrew Nathan has pointed out, China is now "trying to shift more of the impetus for economic growth from export sectors to domestic consumer demand, partly by shifting more income to farmers and partly by improving the social safety net." In other words, in order to ensure continued economic growth, China is trying to move away a little from having to rely too heavily on the vulnerabalities of a predominantly export-driven economy - something that Pomfret has overlooked.


Dan, found your blog a few weeks ago, and really find you have really great, smart, entertaining, useful, down-to-earth and surprisingly unbiased posts, comments, links and analysis - which i think it's really hard to find (if ever found any) these days considering all of the china & west bias conflict going on...

really think you have a great point on "Better to be ranked No.1 on the UN Human Development Index, than to be ranked world's No.1 "superpower"."

after thinking a little bit about it, think today's definition of "the superpower" is simply the nation who can best protect its (government's) interests and influence other nations to fulfill its own interests. And these interests may be or may not be for good for its people, economy, society, politics, health, etc, depending on different people's point of views.

“Pomfret says that he isn't a "China-basher" but one of his constantly reoccuring themes is that China will not become a "superpower" for a very long time, and so Americans need not live in fear of losing their global hegemonic status. I have a lot of problems with this kind of silly discourse.”

Just because Pomfret points out that China will not become a superpower anytime soon also does not suddenly categorize him as a China Basher or any other label for that matter. He does not say that America need not worry about its current status, but rather, China’s current status does not warrant the blame game that Americans have a tendency to play. This is not a new concept and one that many who have witnessed real, honest to god, China bashing in the States understand.

A superpower status, at least in my understanding does not require quotations around the word as its meaning seems generally accepted, is attainable through a nation’s dominating influence over its allies and other states on a global scale, which both the USSR and the US have obtianed through military and economic means. I don’t see how standards of living would qualify a nation as a superpower. I have never seen an argument for Norway being nominated as a superpower either, but I admit not having Googled these two words terms to see what I get.

“Yet Pomfret argues that China will not only be any time soon emerging as the next world's "superpower", but that is even faces a possible collapse - because, he says, it faces too many internal contradictions that will act as fetters on its ability to further develop economically.”

I suggest a second reading of the article specifically the fifth paragraph:
“It's not that I'm a China-basher, like those who predict its collapse because they despise its system and assume that it will go the way of the Soviet Union. I first went to China in 1980 as a student, and I've followed its remarkable transformation over the past 28 years. I met my wife there and call it a second home. I'm hardly expecting China to implode. But its dream of dominating the century isn't going to become a reality anytime soon.”

Pomfret explicitly states that he is NOT predicting the impending collapse of China. Lumping Pomfret into the ‘sky is falling’ pundit group seems to be the lynchpin that allows the argument to then liken Pomfret to Minxin Pei and others who are not even quoted in the editorial. I don’t see this as being relevant to Pomfret’s arguments as it does not address them directly but instead uses misdirection to move to more conveniently controversial China pundits that ultimately are used to prove Pomfret as fearing China. Huh?

Level-headed, nuanced arguments seem to become polarized with little care of the real intent when it comes to discussions regarding China recently. Emotions are running high and even if you don’t belong on one side or the other or even if you have carved out your own ideas you suddenly find yourself on one team or another – China Basher, bleeding heart liberal, Panda Hugger, or a neo-con. You may actually disagree with Pomfret’s argument in the editorial that China will not become a superpower anytime soon; you may not care if China ever becomes a superpower – whatever your definition – but speciously debating a specter editorial distracts from a real debate on the actual topic: will China become a superpower anytime soon?

"the government has announced the abolition of both the household registration system, which blocked job-seeking peasants from enjoying full resident status in cities".

Does anyone have more details about this decision ? I've never heard of it before.

The term "Superpower" comes from the world of geopolitics. They use terms like regional power as well as Great Power. Think of WWI, when the Great Powers went to war with each other. After WWII, the USA and USSR each emerged as something new which had never been seen before: Great Powers with truly global reach. They concerned themselves not with their own spheres of influence, but with every nation worldwide. Hence, a new term was needed, Superpower.

With the collapse of the USSR, the USA is the only remaining superpower. The term has been greatly abused, when its real meaning is "Great Power". China, for instance, will never be a superpower as it has no interests in, say, the Caribbean, or the Pacific islands. It is a mere Great Power, but of course people don't understand geopolitics, so the term Superpower is bandied about. THus the source of the confusion.

You also see people misusing the term "Second world" not to mean the Soviet bloc, but developing nations. First world = the free Western nations, second world = behind the Iron Curtain, third world = everyone else.

@Jeremy

The household registration system has NOT been abolished. Some of its more stringent regulations were repealed in order to allow the migrations we've seen in the past few years, but the system itself is still very much in place. Just ask the migrant workers who want to enrol their kids in school.

First of all, I see two problems with the overarching “superpower” status. One is definitional and the other temporal. I think the term “superpower” needs to be disaggregated somewhat into whether you mean an economic or military superpower, or both. There’s also a tendency to conflate the term superpower to mean hegemon. To achieve proper hegemonic status, I think one must have BOTH overwhelming economic power and a preponderance of military strength. In our contemporary world, only the United States comes close to qualifying. Of course, any discussion of “superpower” bring to light the issue of “power” itself. But that’s a complicated discussion that requires sustained debate. On the temporal issue, one needs to outline a timeframe of when to expect China to clinch that “superpower” status. The idea of “catching up” presupposes that the US and EU are to remain stagnant, which would allow China to supercede them in 2020, 2030, 2050, 20XX, etc at current rates of respective growth. And if we are to hypothetically use the US in 2008 as the bar by which to gauge whether superpower status has been achieved, that means China’s GDP has to multiply by roughly 8 times to even reach parity with the current US level on a per capita GDP basis (China’s GDP is 1/4 of US’ but population is 4 times that of the US).

Now, turning to the four points Pomfret highlighted and that you refuted, I’d just offer some additional thoughts (this is not meant to endorse or reject either Pomfret’s or your points).

One, while it’s probably true that untapped labor productivity in China could spur further growth, I’m not sure whether labor productivity is necessarily a good indicator of economic prowess. To increase labor productivity you need a host of different inputs to promote it, such as technology, education. Those things just take a long time to permeate. So this is a temporal issue.

Two, there is pent-up demand as you say in China’s burgeoning middle class. But because of fundamental market imbalances, supply may become increasingly incapable of meeting that demand. Pricing reform is needed in China’s energy sectors. And China’s financial system is not particularly sound. Those are serious problems that China must address to one, develop the jobs that would utilize more high-end labor and two, to ensure that it maintains a stable macro economy.

Three, the environmental problems are very serious. And it’s possible that a concerted focus could solve some of the most pressing ones. I tend to agree that the silver lining here is the promotion of innovation and technological leaps in environmental and efficiency technologies. But in the short term, however, inefficient industries are going to be treated harshly as stringent policies from the top curb their output or simply hang them out to dry. A microcosm of this is the industrial shutdown around Beijing for the Olympics, which will surely disrupt regional economic growth to some extent. What happens when environmental standards impact heavy industry in a big way, causing shutdowns, layoffs, leading to general social discontent?

Four, actually, China’s current model of development has invited some envy, particularly among undemocratic countries. That certainly counts as some sort of “ideational” power in terms of ideology. China is one of the remaining major countries that has maintained a single party system AND a flourishing economy. Historically, theories of developmentalism assume that economic liberalization leads to political democratization. But so far, China has eluded the fundamental assumptions of that theory. Regimes in the developing world find such a political economy model rather appealing, I think, and this may be a realization of Mao’s old dream of leading the “third world.”

And one addendum to the point about labor productivity. An increase in productivity is typically positively related to an increase in mechanization. The reason that something like 3% of US work force is in agricultural, but still produces enough for the entire country and export is because of extremely efficient mechanized processes that require less human capital.

Though I’m not a labor expert on China, my sense is that job creation is certainly a much higher priority than ramping up labor productivity (which, if you agree with the above assessment, would come at the cost of jobs). If you were Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao, who are generally viewed as more populist in orientation, you’d probably be much more concerned about ensuring more or less full employment. That said, if China seriously develops other highly viable sectors in the services industry or others, then that would solve some of the employment issues. But again, those jobs in the so-called “new econonmy” require a certain level of education to obtain. I just think that structurally, China cannot move to a similar dynamic as the US or Western Europe in the foresseable future. But this issue alone does not preclude China from being perceived as a “superpower,” however you choose to define it.

To answer Tim's question, will China become a superpower?

Never, at least not in the way that the US has been. The Chinese aspire to be ONE of the powers in a multi-polar world, not THE power. It is both realistic and wise, as the Chinese saying goes: 木秀于林,风必摧之. China is truly the Middle Kingdom, it is all about being in the middle of the road. It is called "中庸".

@ robertb

That's what I thought too... Thanks for the clarification.

I personally understand a "superpower" to be a country whose military might is able to influence other countries on a global scale.

Based on this, I doubt China will become a superpower simply because of it's consistant policy of not interfering with other countries' internal affairs (ie, I doubt China will ever attack another country without provocation, except for perhaps Taiwan or Mongolia in calls for reunification, those are issues unto themselves). However, I see China using its might to get in the way of global progress (ie Sudan, Burma, etc.) to preserve its own interests, a more passive agression rather than active. I see China as being a super-roadblock at worst, a big economy with questionable domestic politics or human rights at best.

Tim - yes, you are right, I should have read Pomfret's text with greater care before rushing in to comment on it. My apologies - I knocked up my response in quite a hurry, just before rushing off to work, as I mentioned earlier.

Pomfret, as you correctly point out, is not predicting China's collapse. Nevertheless, he does seem to belittle China at times. In 2004 for example, he was reported as having said that "Not all of China’s dreams are going to be achieved because hard-wired into their DNA are serious constraints that will keep China from becoming what it aspires to." (see: http://www.evworld.com/article.cfm?storyid=780)

His use of the DNA metaphor is very telling, I think.

His argument that China's will most likely not be able to achieve its dreams of becoming a devloped country is certainly open to debate, and as I said in my initial comment, although he gets his fact right, he leaves out half the picture. His is hardly, in my opinion, a balanced assessment, and for this reason I think his assumptions (or predicatinos) are questionable.

Also, Tim, I didn't mean to argue that living standards ought be used as a measurement of superpower status. Of course not. I simply I wanted to question the desirability of becoming a superpower. It seems rather silly to belittle a lower middle income country like China for being a long way off ever becoming a superpower. It's stating the obvious, and it's belittling. Rather than focussing on China's achievements, and on assessing its problems in the wider context of its achievements, Pomfret instead highlights the problems, the challenges, and with the aim of demonstrating the fact that China is far from being a threat to the United States. His intentions in doing so might very be be honourable, but his overall tone remains negative. It would be more revealing to compare China to other lower middle income countries, rather than to compare it to developed ones.

The "dream" of most Chinese is for their living standards to improve, not to gain the status of being a superpower. True, Pomfret's message is aimed not at the Chinese, but at his fellow Americans - at those, specifically, who view China as a threat. The way that he formulates his reassuring message though, is by belittling China through the presentation of a one-sided view.

Just because non-Pacific attitudes and assumptions about the Pacific often irritate me:

Mr Ningbo: China does have interests in the Pacific. It is one of the last battlegrounds in the Mainland/Taiwan war for diplomatic recognition, and several Pacific states are constantly switching between the two depending on who's offering the better deal (can't blame them, most Pacific states are cash-strapped, and the only one that could reasonably be considered wealthy is Australia). There's also the vast mineral wealth in Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to think of, not to mention China's first ever free trade agreement signed with a developed country (New Zealand, which has racked up a number of 'firsts' with China- first developed country to recognise China as a market economy, for example).

And need I mention recent (as in the last couple of years) anti-Chinese riots involving the torching of entire Chinatowns in Honiara and Nuku'alofa? These events were a result of a complex mix of Chinese interests and local politics.

It's a big mistake to assume that because the Pacific is made up of a few small, far-flung states and some of the few remaining colonies of Britain, France and America scattered through the world's biggest ocean and that events in the Pacific rarely make the news north of the equator that nobody has interests there.

Anyway, regardless of whether or not China has interests in the Pacific (or the Caribbean or anywhere else), it would seem pretty clear that whether or not China is, is destined to, wants to, or may possibly become a superpower, it already has a fair amount of influence over world affairs. All that Western hand-wringing over its investments in Africa or its influence (real or imagined, and I suspect as much imagined as real) over Sudan or Myanmar/Burma makes it pretty clear that even if China is not, or will never be a superpower, it certainly is a Power.

What matters is not GDP per capita. What matters is the tax base. With greater resources at her fingertips, China will be able to do more than most other countries.

I've just finished a discussion about this article with a friend of mine whose job involves China, and I thought I would ask a question or two.

We both agreed that, setting aside whether the article was China bashing or not, it implied that China's current system might not be sustainable. I think Pomfret overstates the creative problem, and China's environmental record obviously has to improve, but I am curious to see if anyone has a take on whether China has to continue to undergo large changes and if so, what those changes would be.

Obviously "changes" is very vauge, but just as an example, what effect might what seems to be a pretty serious demographic problem have on the politics of the country? Even in the United States, where we have a realtively broad consensus on how to deal with the eldery, the effects of an aging society touches upon all aspects of our politics and economy. Perhaps I am making too easily swayed by the demographic argument, but one only need to look to Europe and see how these shifts can have far-reaching effects. If China were to gauarantee a roughly equal standard of living through old age, how would this presumably massive bill effect how the economy is managed? Would there be political ramifications if they didn't guarantee any sort of assistance to the eldery?

Anyway, I'd be interested to hear whatever people have to say about this in particular or the general question I ask. I am by no means a China expert, but I've been reading the blog for about a month and greatly enjoy it.

Chris,

China sure has interests in the Pacific. But beyond wooing countries to join its non-stop struggle against recognizing the ROC(Taiwan), not much. I'd think if one day mainland China and Taiwan reunify China will not spend as heavily as it has been on those tiny island nations in the Pacific.

Chip,

I don't know about you, but I'd think a "passive and indirect aggressor" like China is better than a "active and direct aggressor" like the US? Also I'd think many countries could wear the "a big economy with questionable domestic politics or human rights at best" hat? No?

MAJ,

You hit the nail on the head. Why should the Chinese want China to be a superpower? Other than the superficial bragging rights and "face" that come with it, what are the incentives?

Again, the higher you get, the harder you fell. Rome was the case in point. Let the US keep the crown and the problems associated with it, the Chinese should just focus on solving their problems and improving their lives.

@MAJ

Rather than focussing on China's achievements, and on assessing its problems in the wider context of its achievements, Pomfret instead highlights the problems, the challenges, and with the aim of demonstrating the fact that China is far from being a threat to the United States. His intentions in doing so might very be be honourable, but his overall tone remains negative. It would be more revealing to compare China to other lower middle income countries, rather than to compare it to developed ones.

Most of the flaws in his reasoning have already been pointed put, but this is a bizarre line of reasoning. It's as if any discussion of racism in Germany requires a long expose on how much progress has taken place since the Nazi era. I see no reason why discussing China requires a separate protocol that is different from other countries. And Pomfret is a knowledgeable writer on China, who speaks fluent Chinese (unlike MAJ) and has been traveling to China for almost 30 years. It takes some nerve to accuse Pomfret of ignoring China's progress.

Andreas - I agree with you, Pomfret does indeed overstates the creative problem. His example, the supposed envy by the Chinese at having not creatively conceiving of the cartoon Kangfu Panda first, is just plain ridiculous. I lived, and taught in China for five years, and I can say that the levels of creativity demonstrated by Chinese secondary and tertiary students is no more or less than that of the students I taught in South Korea, Japan, England and Australia. This idea that Asian students are less creative than Western students is a myth as far as I am concerned.

He overlooks the fact that China has some of the world's most skillful and creative engineers, and the Chinese mainland film industry is extremely successful internationally, especially here in Australia and parts of Europe, most notably France. In fact, Kangfu Panda is full of cliche, with many of its images have originated in Chinese made films,

I enjoyed Mr. Jones' email.

I agree with your statements about the need for a clear definition of "superpower". Pomfret didn't appear to give a clear definition, and partially as a result neither did I.

I also agree with this statement: "What matters is that [China] continues to develop economically and socially, so that per capita living standards can continue to improve."

If I had to say I was replying to any definition of "superpower" of Pomfrets' it would be more of a "popular" definition rather than an academic definition; a Chinese superpower would be militarily confident and economically and socially developed. A superpower would be an entity that can project its force overwhelmingly and has the ability to influence geopolitical events on a worldwide scale. Other countries would need to plan around this country's policies. In that sense, the United States and the USSR were "superpowers"; to some degree, the economic Japanese juggernaut was in the late 1980s and 1990s. Increasingly, China is becoming an economic superpower.

I wrote a little more on the comments on my blog post; and will write more on Sunday/Monday when I post part II of the series. I enjoyed reading everyone's comments.

~China Comment.

Maybe Pomfret isn't a "China-basher" but as MAJ says, he is very unbalanced and he does belittle China every chance he gets. There is often a smug ethnocentrism that oozes from his pen. As somebody who has taught in China for more than 7 years, and as somebody who weekly visits Shanghai's art galleries and watches Chinese mainland movies, I can say that I know for sure that the Chinese are just as creative as everyone else in the world. Pomfret's smug belittling of the Chinese as incapable of producing movies like "Kang Fu Panda" is dumb. I've seen a pirated copy on DVD here, which I've brought back to the UK where I'm now visiting relos, and while it might be great for young kids, it's hardly all that original, as it appropriates lots of images that have their origins in mainland, Taiwanese and Hong Kong films - especially from the films by Zhang Yimou, Ang Lee and of course Bruce Lee. Very little about that film is original, it's full of cliches and Orientalist depictions of the Chinese and of Chinese landscapes, designed to appeal to young American kids. Pomfret uses this film as an example to show how creative Americans are compared to the Chinese, saying that "Blockbusters don't grow out of the barrel of a gun. Neither do superpowers in the age of globalization." But the mainland Chinese film industry has produced numerous blocbusters over the past decade, so what's he on about?

Hemulen,

"And Pomfret is a knowledgeable writer on China, who speaks fluent Chinese (unlike MAJ) and has been traveling to China for almost 30 years. It takes some nerve to accuse Pomfret of ignoring China's progress."

Your argument is ridiculous. Even if MAJ is not as knowledeable about China as you think Pomfret is; even if MAJ does not speak fluent Chinese; even if he has not been in China for 30 years, it does not necessarily weaken the points MAJ made.

The fact that Pomfret speaks Chinese and had been in China for a while does not automatically make him a China hand. I for one think Pomfret is way overrated. He almost strikes me as somebody who brags about how much he knows about China and the Chinese. So he thinks.

The comment above addressed to Andreas was written be me - it seems as though I forgot to type in my details. Sorry, I always seem to be in a hurry when I type up these comments, and so I make numerous errors.

Hemulen - with all due respect, I don't think my line of reasooning is absurd here. Pomfret does get his facts correct (I said that in my original comment) and he isn't a "China-basher", as I later acknowledged in my response to Tim. But he does, as gregory in his comment above points out, exude at times a rather smug ethnocentrism - he often bilittles China, in my opinion. He doesn't pay enough attention to China's achievements, so his conclusions tend to be based on unbalanced assessments. I don't think I'm the only one here who is saying this, either.

As for your point about racism in Germany, well, I think you have taken what I said right out of context. I was not offering a separate protocol for evaluating China. Let me say this: if a journalist was to significantly exaggerate the seriousness and extent of racism in today's Germany, then he or should ought to have their views challenged with the offering up a more balanced and empirically-based assessment. Simple as that. All I'm doing here, in response to Pomfret's assessments of China, is just that. I'm expressing my personal point of view, which is that Pomfret's conclusions are based on assessments that he makes of today's China that are unbalanced, in that he is overly negative. He also exhibts a certain degree of enthnocentrism, in my opinion.

China Comments has offered an alternative reading of China and where it is heading that is, again, in my opinion, superior, because (rather than being one-dimension like Pomftret's), China Comments assessment is dialectical in its approach, taking into account numerous strengths as well weaknesses, and showing how these opposing forces might interact in ways that will continue to propel China forward towards some kind of Superpower status.

Hemulen, my Mandarin is mostly limited to being able to order a beer, or various dishes in a restaurant, while Pomfret is quite fluent. So what? My spouse was born and bred in China, no doubt speaks better Mandarin than Pomfret, yet she certainly doesn't agree with any of his assessments. Because somebody is fluent in Mandarin, and because they have spent a great deal of time living in China, doesn't necessarily mean that they must necessarily have the analytical skills to match. As a journalist, I suspect that Pomfret is most likely quite used to accentuating the negatives, so as to help sell newspapers. That is his job, after all. For those who are after more nuanced, more soberly balanced and empirically-based assessments, then I suggest not relying too heavily on the views of journalists, no matter how popular they are. Academic sources, I would suggest, are more useful, though journalists often do provide useful insights and sometimes they uncover important events that ought to be told. Pomfret is very knowledgeable on China, I know, and he is also a very talented writer, but I don't think that he's the great analytical expert that many like to think of him as.

China Comment- I'm pleased that you enjoyed reading my response, though it was written in a hurry, and could have been more carefully constructed and argued. I made a few factual errors, which I have already acknowledged in an earlier comment addressed to Tim. I will check out your additional remarks over on your site later in the day.

gregory - you said exactly what I wanted to say. Pomfret does indeed demonsrate at times a "smug ethnocentrism", as you say.

Best regards to all,
MAJ

There is one thing that everyone seems to be overlooking in the question of whether China is going to be a colossus over the globe: the existence of that other rapidly-growing economy with more than a billion people: India (and this one is a liberal democracy, too--bonus!)

And don't forget Russia--if any country could qualify as "super roadblock" Russia would be it.

"Smug ethnocentrism." Quite a charge. Where is the evidence?

And it may be true that Pomfret is more pessimistic than other journalists. I don't blame him or anyone else who saw the events of June 4 first-hand.

I have read POMFRET'S book, CHINESE LESSONS, and he is definitely a China Basher. On page 300 of his book he says "For centuries, Chinese debated what it was to be a good person, a good citizen...[but] fifty-plus years of Communist censorship and political campaigns have silenced those debates, and it is still unclear whether the country has the ability to revive the tradition of asking these timeless questions." This is just plain rubbish. Of course the Chinese debate what it means to be a good citizen. I don't believe that he is fuent in Mandarin. If he was, then he'd surely read the Chinese books, journals and websites, and would know just how much such a question is debated EVERY SINGLE DAY of the year!!!!!! He clearly knows NOTHING!

He also says on page 300 that "China will grow old before is has grown rich". I disagree, and for the same reasons given by China Comments.

POMFRET also says on page 300 that "China's younger generation" is too "coddled" by parents and too trapped in "virtual reality" to enable China to continue to prosper. How silly is he? Chinese younger generation is more open and educated today then ever, and so many now travel the world and study abroad, and the internet savvy Chinese student is more aware of the world than ever! I bet they know more about the world than most of their American counterparts!!!!!

POMFRET is more than just "ethnocentric". He is a racist, who wills China to fail.

MAJ, you're often a breath of fresh air. Pffefer too! As you both said, Pomfret may have mastered the Chinese language, but he clearly hasn't mastered the skills of analysis.

As for your point about racism in Germany, well, I think you have taken what I said right out of context. I was not offering a separate protocol for evaluating China. Let me say this: if a journalist was to significantly exaggerate the seriousness and extent of racism in today's Germany, then he or should ought to have their views challenged with the offering up a more balanced and empirically-based assessment. Simple as that. All I'm doing here, in response to Pomfret's assessments of China, is just that. I'm expressing my personal point of view, which is that Pomfret's conclusions are based on assessments that he makes of today's China that are unbalanced, in that he is overly negative. He also exhibts a certain degree of enthnocentrism, in my opinion.

Pomfret is surely a pessimist, but a racist, smug ethnocentrist and a China basher? This discussion has really reached new low points, I'm speechless...

Hemulen,

I agree with you. I read Pomfret's book and I have heard him speak a couple of times on NPR and, if anything, I would describe him as a China lover. He is no racist and that accusation is ridiculous. Pointing out China's problems (even if wrong), does not a racist make.

I also think the attacks on Pomfret's language skills and knowledge of China are ridiculous. The guy speaks Chinese and he knows and understands China. That does not mean he is always right about China, but nobody is.

Dan - as I have been saying, Pomfret is very knowledgeable about China, and he is also a very talented writer. I accept that Pomfret is not a China-basher too, and I certainly wouldn't call him a racist. But in my opinion, he does indeed, as gregory wrote, exude at times a "smug ethnocentrism" and a few quotes have been offered up on this thread to help support that claim: his sweeping arguments about China's younger generations being a factor that will contribute to China's inability to continue making sound developmental progress because they're too spoilt, his use of DNA metaphors to describe how the Chinese are inherently not up to the task of managing their problems, his overstating of the creativity argument, etc. The fact that he consistently accentuates the negatives is also very telling.

Pomfret is, again, as I have been saying, correct with his facts, and right to point out China's problems and weaknesses where he see them, but the problem is that his assessments are most likely very flawed, and that's because he takes a one-dimensional approach.

MAJ

Dan,

I don't think Pomfret is a racist but he does belittle China a lot, IMO. There is a differnce between pointing out China's problems and ridiculing the Chinese along the way, as he often does.

As to Pomfret's overrated languguage skills and knowledge, Dan, I beg to differ: Once again, just because he speaks Chinese it doesn't necessarily make him an expert on China. Following this logic ALL Chinese understand China very well (which I don't think is correct) and an English-speaking Chinese expat living in the US understands the US very well (you see how absurd the logic is).

To point out that China is not yet capable of producing a movie like Kungfu Panda is not "smug ethnocentrism," it's stating a fact. Very few countries has that technology and know-how. The same goes for his other statements many of which have been made by many Chinese as well.

Pffefer,

I never said that Pomfret's knowledge of Chinese meant he understood China. I said the guy speaks Chinese AND he understands China. No cause and effect relationship, rather, two unconnected statements.

Believe me, I understand not all 1.3 billion Chinese understand their country.

In fact, one of the most ridiculous things I encounter is when someone tells me they don't need legal help getting into China because their wife or girlfriend is Chinese, as though that fact alone makes them an international attorney. It is the equivalent of saying everyone in the United States is capable of assisting a Chinese company with the Chinese, International, and US laws relating to foreign businesses. Nutty.

1: i dont care if Pomfret is a China-basher.(He should just deliver a good objective work with good research.)

2: i dont care if he knows China or not. (seriously. noone knows China. even Chinese do not know own land. someone can consentrate himslef on one thing like politics or daylife or cuisine. but if he says "i know China". well.. call the ambulance, psyhologist has to work.)

3: China is a super power. (some politcan said that "power"0in international politics is to press forign nuts without to be kicked back. for exsample USA does it with forgin tourists when it get all their private and business informations just for 2 weeks in NY or Washington. Do you see just only one another goverment doing a same with americans?)

4: China is very rich. and i mean not people. i mean goverment and state. China is not USA and power of chinese communsit goverment is much more present in dayly life and politics.

If one discusses the topic of whether China is a superpower in China, one gets very few attention. But instead, one could get a lot of critical remarks from Chinese readers. The Chinese people do not perceive the country to ever move in the direction. They want to live a better life, a better governed country, that's it. There are many problems, but people are convinced that the country is moving in the right direction. That is why when the government is repressing some anti-CPC views or individuals, the mass can stand on the CPC side. I have recently read a lot of anti-western human r1ghts blog articles in Chinese forums, exactly because of stepped-up western criticisms of the country's human r1ghts practices, esp. after the biased report coverage of T1bet incident.

I still remember how the housing registration system worked in the start of 1990s. My wife had difficulty finding a job in Beijing due to the system even though I was a government official myself. I was in the core of the debate in the Chinese central government. The question for the government is not whether the problem exists or whether the problem is recognized, but instead how to resolve the problem in a feasible, strategic manner. If you look at the housing registration regime now, it is much much more liberal and accomodates people's needs. During the course, China has avoided the emergence of slum areas in urban cities prevalent in so many developing countries.

I also saw the introduction of Pei's work, but I did not even try to read the whole stuff. To me, it has missed the whole point of China's reality. It focuses on the problems without trying to find pragmatic solutions. It is hasty to draw wishful conclusions. It is a discussion, but not hugely useful.

For another example, some Western politicians are so hysterical about death penalty in China. PM of New Zealand is a recent example. Human r1ghts groups such as Amnesty International have been vocal on the point. To me, it is not a constructive effort simply to criticise the death penalty in China. The perception is that the Chinese government is violating human r1ghts by death penalty. But put the issue for a discussion at any popular forum in China. You can immediately receive a lot of support for death penalty, much more than opposition. Due to simplistic criticism of China's human r1ghts violations, sometimes on the wrong issues, the West can cause exactly the opposite response from the Chinese people, let alone the Chinese government officials. Nowadays, it has commonly understood in China that the West does not sincerelfy care about the human r1ghts of the Chinese people, but instead use it as a pretext to obstruct the peaceful development and improvement of people's well-being of the country. The recent Western agitation on the T1bet issue has convinced many in China that the West wants China to be carved up into smaller kingdoms again.

Coming back to the death penalty again, I wonder whether there is any utility for a human r1ghts organization or Western politician to criticize China's death penalty simply because many countries have done the same. What can be much more useful is academic exchanges. I know Chinese scholars have published articles arguing for abolition of death penalty. Selling the convincing arguments for abolishing death penalty to Chinese elites without critisizing the policy take a long time, but can be much more productive, and in the long run a quicker way for change for the better in China. The reason is very simple: before putting in place any change in policy or law, the elites have to study it first, digest it, see the benefits theoretically and then debate with others, try to sell it to more decision makers and people. The process takes some time. It is the basics of change management. Otherwise, the Chinese elites would just ignore any criticism from the West, or even protest against the West.

Yujun Lao,

Not sure motives even matter at all, but if they do, isn't it a bit simplistic to ascribe one motive to everyone in the West?

It's fun going back and reading your older posts to see how well they stand up. My verdict: you are doing a great job. Looks like Pomfret is still right on China becoming a superpower, but for how much longer will we be able to say that is true?

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John Pomfret As China Basher? What Is A Superpower Anyway?: