Troubled Loan Trail Leads to China -- Do Not Try This At Home

Today's Wall Street Journal has an interesting article on foreigners purchasing Chinese bad debt. Entitled "Troubled Loan Trail Leads to China,"  The article talks about how buyers of nonperforming loans (NPL) have lately been focusing on China.  The article describes these purchases as high-risk, high-return.  You think? 

This article comes on the heels of an Ernst & Young report, out today, that accesses the global market in nonperforming loans and concludes China is today's hot market, based mostly on its just now opening up to foreigners and on its having done little with its bad loans for years: 

Even China is poised to allow foreign investor�s access to its banking industry. Despite a slow start, the NPL disposition process has accelerated in the last 12 months. However, China�s NPL problems appear far from over considering China�s large numbers of legacy (pre-1997) loans still to resolve and an estimated total NPL exposure of US$900 billion � substantially more than any other region in the report.

The WSJ article highlights Chicago based DAC Management and its founder and president, Phil Groves, and their extensive experience in buying Chinese distressed assets:

Phil Groves, founder and president of DAC Management, an investment firm with offices in Beijing, Hong Kong and Chicago, has been investing in troubled loans and distressed real estate in China during the past five years. He recently bought a Ramada Inn in the northern city of Dalian after the bank foreclosed on the property.

A big challenge with these investments can be confirming who holds clear title to the property, Mr. Groves says. Also, the Chinese government may have part ownership in a company and a "certain loan may have importance to the government," he adds. "I am still learning new things every day and I am five years into it."

We here at China Law Blog have known and been impressed by Mr. Groves and his China business for quite some time.  In fact, just a few months ago, Steve flew down to Dalian and stayed at the Dalian Ramada, mentioned in the article (which really is quite a nice hotel), to meet with Mr. Groves. 

Investing in distressed Chinese assets is indeed a risky business, but those who know what they are doing in this business and in China do seem to be securing good returns. 

Comments (4)

Read through and enter the discussion by using the form at the end
Joseph Wang - May 5, 2006 11:27 PM

The Ernst and Young report has a very serious error in that if you compare its numbers on NPL's with the one's that most everyone else is putting out, it's pretty obvious that they are double counting the NPL's attributable to joint-stock commercial banks.

Also, there seemed to be somewhat of a "conflict of interest" in the Ernst and Young report in that they were both trying to assess the severity of the NPL problem and also seem to have a business that benefited from disposing distressed property.

Finally, there is one thing to be careful about here. A lot of the SOE's which are managed by the asset management companies are suddenly of interest because they hold land use rights to real estate in booming urban areas. The trouble with this is that the valuation on urban land could be a bubble that produces new NPL's.

China Law Blog - May 6, 2006 6:20 AM

Mr. Wang --

Thanks for checking in.

Are you sure it is double counting that leads to E&Y's doubling the NPL, or is it just that they are being more realistic? I have not been able to see the actual report itself, just summaries. Is it possible E&Y's number is so high for the very reason you give in your last paragraph -- that the fixed assets held by many of loan holders are ripe for a fall. I doubt this would be the case, but who knows?

Joseph Wang - May 6, 2006 7:53 AM

Here is the link

If you go on page 14, they list $225 billion in potential future NPL's in banks which they carry over to the next set of figures, which they list as NPL's for the big four, and then they add another $323 billion for miscellaneous NPL's outside the big four.

If you compare those numbers with those that practically everyone has, its pretty obvious that they double counted the $225 billion. Most of the new NPL's are likely to be in the JSCB's which have accounted for most of the real estate lending. The bulk of real estate lending from the big four comes from China Construction Bank, and their risk management is likely to be pretty good.

(I have some problems with the numbers they use which I think are high, but those are issues which people can rationally debate. I don't think the overall NPL rate for new loans is going to be 20%, and I think the value for the pre-1998 NPL's is high by about $100 billion. The latter is important because if you cut the pre-1998 NPL by about $100 billion, you end up with the situation that the big four banks have more or less clean balance sheets, which with the expection of the Agricultural Bank of China, I think to be the case.

The double counting of JSCB NPL's looks like an outright mistake.)

China Law Blog - May 15, 2006 1:12 AM

AUTHOR: China Law Blog
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DATE: 05/15/2006 01:12:03 AM

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